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THE ONE-CONGRESS FICTION IN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
WILLIAM W. BUZBEE'
Reliance on fictions and simplifying assumptions in the interpretation
of statutes may be inevitable, but should courts look across statutes or regulatory
fields and draw inferences from linguistic choices in dfferent statutes? Injus-
tifying such statutory comparisons and their interpretive conclusions, judges
often state or imply that these linguistic comparisons reveal that Congress
knows how to express itself in a more authoritative way, even where statutes
were enacted by different sessions of Congress, arose out of different contexts,
and concerned different subjects. This interpretive move is referred to in this
Article as "the one-Congress fiction." Examination of this technique in Su-
preme Court jurisprudence reveals significant problems with its application,
logic, and theoretical underpinnings. Furthermore, this Article's critique raises
larger questions about the normative claims underpinning this and other tex-
tualist modes of statutory interpretation, particularly claims that textualism
enhances the quality of legislation, reduces opportunities for ends-oriented judi-
cial decisionmaking, and deters undemocratic manipulation of the legislative
process. Central to the error of the one-Congress fiction is its implicit assump-
tion that Congress, in legislating, is in a conversation only with itself In real-
ity, and as well developed in empirical and theoretical critiques of political pro-
cess, the process of law enactment, implementation, and interpretation
inevitably changes the implications of particular language in unpredictable
ways. Far from being the product of a closed system memorialized only in the
United States Code, legislation arises out of a dynamic process involving many
actors. The Article concludes that a more context-sensitive method of interpreta-
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tion that focuses on each statute and its particular structure, genesis, and im-
plementation history would far better serve the normative goals of textualism
and conceptions of legislative supremacy than does the one-Congress ftion
technique.
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THE ONE-CONGRESS FICTION
INTRODUCTION
While the Constitution speaks of "a Congress"' consisting of a
Senate and House of Representatives, the concept of a single Con-
gress producing legislation is undoubtedly a fiction. As reflected in
the numbering of a new Congress every two years, different members,
coalitions, parties, moods, and leadership change the nature of each
Congress. Furthermore, changes in the White House and administra-
tive agency leadership modify the political direction a particular Con-
gress will pursue. Even if there were no changes in executive and leg-
islative officeholders, shifting coalitions and the ever-changing legal
and political context would create different alliances of interest
groups and politicians supporting and opposing both existing laws
and legislative proposals, especially where laws target diverse substan-
tive fields.
Despite the reality of different Congresses and an inevitably shift-
ing legal and political terrain, it is a commonplace occurrence for
judges, particularly several members of the current Supreme Court, to
justify a particular interpretation of a disputed statutory provision by
making reference to other statutes' identical, similar, or different pro-
visions. This cross-referencing of similarly phrased or directed provi-
sions in different statutes is often justified with the use of the fiction
that there is one Congress that knows how to achieve a certain goal or
capture a certain meaning when "Congress wants" to do so, as evi-
denced by the referenced provisions in other statutes. This Article re-
fers to this interpretive move as "the one-Congress fiction." Compar-
ing provisions within a single statute to draw inferences about
meaning is a well-established interpretive ploy that makes consider-
able sense. The interpretive methodology analyzed in this Article, in
contrast, always involves comparisons of isolated provisions in at least
two different statutes. These other provisions, however, are virtually
always the product of a different Congress, and arise out of a different
legal and social context.
That methods of statutory interpretation to varying degrees rely
on fictions about politics, the legislative process, and statutory intent
or meaning has been noted by many others.2 Justice Antonin Scalia,
I U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
For an unusually strong assertion about the inevitability of uses of fictions in
statutory interpretation and the indeterminacy of history, see Eben Moglen & Richard
J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein's New Canons: Choosing the Fictions of Statutoy Interpretation, 57 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1205 (1990) ("[All methods of statutory interpretation] are incom-
plete and premised on fictions.").
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the Justice who most often makes use of the one-Congress fiction in
his statutory interpretation opinions, concedes that such an interpre-
tive methodology relies on a fiction. In his recently published essay, A
Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, Justice Scalia ac-
knowledges that he follows the interpretive canon that statutes should
be construed to be internally consistent, as well as "compatible with
previously enacted laws." 4  He concedes that this is just an "as-
sum [ption] ," and states that "[w]ell of course that is a fiction.', Pro-
fessor Popkin notes in his incisive critique ofJustice Scalia's theory of
statutory interpretation thatJustice Scalia treats "multiple statutes as a
single document written by an ideal drafter who integrates them into
a super-text."6 This assumption of an ideal unitary drafter is, as ob-
served by Popkin, often rooted in disregard for the realities of the
context, history, and intent behind particular disputed statutory provi-
sions.7 Professor Schacter has also noted the Court's use of interstatu-
tory cross-referencing, leading her to comment that "it is fre-
quently ... tenuous to enlist entirely different statutes, passed by
other Congresses, in an originalist search for the intended or reason-
able meaning of a statute."8 Several other scholars have noted this in-
terpretive methodology or offered critiques of related interpretive
techniques, although generally in more nuanced examinations of
other issues. 9 Justices Frankfurter and Stevens have explicitly dis-
3 See infra Part I.B.1, I.B.2, and note 119 (identifying other cases in which the one-
Congress fiction is utilized).
4 ANTONIN SCALA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAw 16 (1997).
5 Id.
6 William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique ofJustice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Inter-
pretation, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1133, 1148 (1992).
7 Seeid. at 1148-52.
8 Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 32 (1998).
9 See, e.g., RONALD DwORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 313-54, 338, 349-50 (1986) (exploring
statutory interpretation approaches and suggesting an interpreter should seek con-
structions "consistent with other legislation in force" and "take account of other deci-
sions that Congress and the courts have made" since enacting the primary statute);
William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 661-64 (1990) (critiqu-
ing new textualist approaches "rest[ing] upon precepts of grammar and logic, proce-
duralism, and federalism"); William Funk, Review Essay: Faith in Texts-Justice Scalia's
Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution: Apostasy for the Rest of Us?, 49 ADMIN. L. REV.
825, 845-46 (1997) (describing Justice Scalia's textualism as rooted in the objective
meaning of statutes and suggesting that such an approach provides little guidance
when the primary statutory text "truly remains ambiguous"); Bradley C. Karkkainen,
"Plain Meaning:" Justice Scalia'sJurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L.
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agreed with the practice of looking at laws as though all were enacted
by a "single draftsman.". FormerJudge Wald of the D.C. Circuit simi-
& PUB. POL'Y 401, 407 (1994) (referring to the idea that a statute's meaning should be
.most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be
integrated" as a "benign fiction");Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the
Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 835-36 (1991) (exploring
textualists' "acontextual approach" and suggesting that emphasizing text over legisla-
tive history can increase "the flexibility of statutes"); RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme
Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administra-
tive State, 95 COLUM. L. RE. 749, 764-76 (1995) (criticizing the Court's "hypertextual-
ism" and arguing in general discussion and through analysis of one hundred years of
trucking regulation and related constitutional law that individual statutes and laws en-
acted over time are likely to be construed in disruptive ways if courts look at text to the
exclusion of implementation history and agencies' many attempts to juggle compli-
cated interrelated provisions); Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: Should
Judges Disdain Political History?, 98 COLuM. L. REV. 242, 245 (1998) (warning that we
should be "cautious about proposing principles of interpretation that... devalue
knowing the context within which the legislature has spoken"); Patricia M. Wald, The
Sizzling Sleeper:. The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of
the United States Supreme Court, 39 A.M. U. L. REV. 277, 307 (1990) (attempting to dispel
the notion that a "yes" vote on a particular bill indicates that the legislator "intends to
gie approval to and put imprimatur on ... the language of the statute ... "and ques-
tioning interpretive approaches built upon a contrary assumption); Nicholas S. Zep-
pos, ChiefJustice Rehnquist, the Two Faces of Ultra-Pluralism, and the Originalist Fallacy, 25
RUTGERS L.J. 679, 681-82 (1994) (arguing that "[t]he subsequent legislative history and
more recently enacted statutes increase the sources of interpretive information and
require the judge to inject fewer of her personal opinions," but characterizing such a
technique as "dynamic pluralis[m]"); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The
NVew" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1615, 1620-22 (1991) [hereinafter
Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism] (commenting that Justice Scalia's textualism goes
beyond "the enacted statute" to examine "the text of other related statutes" and also
noting that Scalia "views the entire United States Code... as a product of a perfectly
rational[,] ... sensible[, and] . . . omniscient legislature" that creates "a coherent and
consistent product over time"); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory In-
terpretation: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 70 TEx. L. REv. 1073, 1085 (1992) [hereinafter Zep-
pos, The Use of Authority] (implicitly impugning interpretive methodologies that are
predicated on notions contrary to the concept that "[legislative outcomes] are entirely
random or fortuitous, largely dependent on who controls the legislative agenda").
Thomas Merrill has also commented on such interpretive techniques:
[M]any of the interpretative techniques relied upon most extensively byJus-
tice Scalia presuppose "a rational or omniscient legislature," rather than a leg-
islature of ad hoc bargains. Included here would be the assumptions that
Congress is a perfect grammarian, that different provisions of a statute reflect
a single, unified structure, that words are used the same way in different stat-
utes, and that Congress is familiar with all provisions in the United States
Code.
Thomas W. Merrill, ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Pluralist Theory, and the Interpretation of Stat-
utes, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 621, 662 (1994) (citations omitted). For a superb textbook flag-
ging of questions about this and several related interpretive techniques, see WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRicKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PuBLIc PoU~cv 832, 839-42 (2d ed. 1995).
1, United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 444 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("If
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larly has stated that the belief of courts that Congress "know[s] the
state of the law when it legislates" rests on "tenuous" assumptions."
Justice Scalia appears to be the member of the current Supreme Court
most inclined to make use of the one-Congress fiction interpretive
approach, but other currentjustices have also authored opinions mak-
ing use of the one-Congress fiction in comparing different statutes'
provisions.
Judges and justices are not alone in using the one-Congress fiction
to derive statutory meaning from a difficult statutory text. Several
prominent academics, chief among them Professor William Eskridge
and former Yale Law Dean and current judge Guido Calabresi, have
advocated modes of statutory interpretation that, if followed by courts,
would allow a more continuous judicial updating of statutory meaning
based on changing political mores without requiring actual textual
change.12 While Eskridge, in particular, is among the more pointed
critics of both Justice Scalia and textualists generally, his call for "dy-
namic" interpretation at times seems to rely on the idea that Congress,
or perhaps society, is a unitary principal whose changing views should
be heeded by its agents, generally courts and administrative agencies.
This Article examines the one-Congress fiction in statutory inter-
pretation, both critiquing the practice itself and using this critique to
explore more deeply the empirical underpinnings and normative
claims used to justify this and other textualist analytical approaches.
In particular, this Article builds on recent empirical and theoretical
explorations of the legislative process to illustrate problems with the
one-Congress fiction and related textualist modes of interpretation.
This interpretive practice gives judges a Herculean interpretive task of
making sense of the law as a whole, and may free them to engage in
just the kind of unpredictable and unprincipled ends-oriented inter-
pretation so vehemently criticized by advocates of textualist methods
of interpretation. Furthermore, due to inherent difficulties in pre-
dicting when and how the one-Congress fiction will be used, the one-
Congress fiction threatens to be used as a sort of random and roving
a single draftsman had drafted each of these provisions in all seventeen statutes, there
might be some reason for believing that the difference in language reflected a differ-
ence in meaning."). Justice Stevens's rejection of such an assumption is also evident in
numerous cases. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stev-
ens's approach and contrasting it with the one-Congress fiction).
1 Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Su-
preme Court Term, 68 IOWAL. REV. 195, 213 (1983).
12 GuiDo CALABRESi, A COMMON LAw FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE,JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
is See ESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 52-55.
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"clear statement" doctrine. The courts may engage in interstatutory
comparisons, but unlike "clear statement" approaches, which courts
tend to apply when central constitutional values are implicated, the
one-Congress fiction may be random and roving because neither legis-
lative actors nor litigators can predict what statutory comparisons will
be made or what inferences are likely to be drawn from vague or omit-
ted language.
Part I begins by reviewing decisions of the Supreme Court from
the last decade in which opinions relied on the one-Congress fiction
by comparing language usage in the "primary" (or disputed) statutory
provision with language in other statutes (the "referents"). At times
the Court views similar language as revealing a common congressional
practice, view, or understanding, while in other cases slight variations
in similar language are given great weight in justifying divergent in-
terpretations of seemingly similar language. However, the Court has
seldom engaged in more than a cursory examination of the compara-
ble texts' context, structure, and history. Even if the comparison of
statutes is inevitable, rarely have such comparisons been made
through the scrutiny of more than isolated text alone.
Part II examines the dynamics of the legislative process, drawing
on the growing and increasingly sophisticated empirical and theoreti-
cal analyses of politics and the legislative process. The Article estab-
lishes that not only is the one-Congress fiction not rooted in American
political reality, but its implicit assumptions are also contradicted by
most scholarly examinations of legislation and the legislative process,
including central tenets of public choice theory that have driven
much of the resurgence of textualist modes of interpretation. Even if
one engages in a counterfactual simplifying assumption of two laws
enacted during a period in which personnel in the White House,
agencies, and Congress did not change, it is difficult to come up with
a sound rationale for why examination of cross-referenced provisions
in different statutes sheds any kind of reliable light on the meaning of
either law.
Part III seeks to derive a sympathetic explanation for the one-
Congress fiction interpretive methodology. This Part both highlights
similarities between this fiction and other well established interpretive
approaches and canons and reviews ways in which such an approach
arguably furthers some public-regarding instrumental goals. This sec-
tion gives particular attention to how the one-Congress fiction shares
attributes with the in pani materia interpretive canon but is ultimately
significanfly distinguishable. Part III also shows that this interpretive
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technique is in substantial tension with several stated goals of advo-
cates of textualism. In particular, textualistsjustify their methodology
in part with claims that their favored approach reduces opportunities
for ends-oriented activist judicial decisionmaking. As the number of
texts that can be relied upon expands, however, mere reference to iso-
lated statutory referents without consideration of historical and statu-
tory context actually expands indeterminacy and judicial discretion.
Reliance on multiple statutory texts alone gives courts substantial lati-
tude, much as does excessive reliance on legislative history, to pick out
comparable language and to use unpredictable interpretive inferences
to reach desired policy ends. Each construction of the comparable
provision in a second statute by the Supreme Court also creates dicta
that can guide or perhaps even modify future interpretations of that
second statute. This Part also briefly compares the proposals of schol-
arly advocates of dynamic interpretive methods, which would allow for
judicial updating of static statutory texts even where statutory lan-
guage remains unchanged.
Part IV ultimately argues that the one-Congress fiction in statutory
interpretation should only be used warily, paying much greater atten-
tion to the whole context out of which the primary statutory provision
and referent provisions arose. Greater attention should be paid to in-
terpretive cues within each statute, with no presumption that similar
or isolated language always means the same thing or that different
language in different statutes should be interpreted to reveal diverse
meanings. Underlying this Article's normative argument is the belief
that courts and agencies should give heed to each statute's language,
structure, and historical context and reward drafters' attention to all
interpretive cues and statements of purpose reflected in a statute's
text. Judicial scrutiny of a statute's historical context, especially of his-
torical materials that are not "self-referential"14 and subject to manipu-
lation, also would show greater respect for traditional concepts of leg-
islative supremacy than does the comparison of isolated text
provisions alone.
The practice of judicial reference to an array of earlier (or even
later) statutes to interpret a disputed provision may in fact undercut
14 By "self-referential" materials, this Article refers to historical materials that re-
flect a legislator's or other political actor's efforts to explain what he or she meant.
Attention to historical context that is not self-referential, in contrast, refers to analysis
of other forms of information about the historical context of a particular disputed
statutory provision, such as past judicial opinions, prevalent drafting strategies at that
time, earlier statutes addressing the same subject matter, and previous agency actions.
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the legislative process. Use of the one-Congress fiction by the judici-
ary reduces the value of each legislative bargain since each legislative
coalition succeeding in enacting a law can predict neither what stat-
utes will be used for purposes of comparison nor whether similar but
slightly varied language will be construed to reveal a consistent or dif-
ferent meaning. The Article concludes that while interpretive as-
sumptions or fictions are often unavoidable in statutory interpretation
methodology, the one-Congress fiction rests on premises that are con-
trary to reality and should be largely abandoned. Even for advocates
of textualist modes of interpretation, the one-Congress fiction should
be recognized as an unsound text-based interpretive technique.
The United States Code is only one source of law, with other legal
developments outside of the Code influencing future efforts to
change those portions of the law placed in the Code. The world of
statutes is not a closed system in which only Congress influences the
import of each legal enactment. Congress enacts laws in different pe-
riods, to be implemented by different agencies and administrations,
against a different backdrop of case law, statutes, and agency regula-
tion. Different interpretive communities are both the targets of legis-
lative initiatives and participants in the legislative process. Exclusively
text-based comparisons of isolated statutory provisions reflect an im-
poverished and politically unrealistic view of legislation and the legis-
lative process.
I. ONE-CONGRESS FICTION PRECEDENTS
This Part explains in greater detail the meaning of the one-
Congress fiction, first explaining the basic interpretive ploy, and then
analyzing recent Supreme Court cases in which this interpretive ap-
proach was used. This Part's case analysis sets the stage for the theo-
retical and normative critique that follows.
A. The One-Congress Fiction Defined
In this Article, "the one-Congress fiction" is used as a shorthand
term to refer to the following statutory interpretation methodology.
The primary statute, "SI," is the subject of an interpretive dispute be-
fore the courts. Another statute, which this Article will refer to as the
"cross-referenced" provision or the "referent," and later as "S2," con-
tains language that due to its similar purpose or its word choice is
viewed by the court as helpful in interpreting the primary statute. To
justify this interpretive comparison, courts either implicitly or explic-
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itly consider the presence or absence of particular language in the
primary and referent provisions as revealing a particular meaning or
legislative intent. Despite Congress's collective nature, it is sometimes
anthropomorphized, in the sense that courts make interpretive con-
clusions based on Congress's assumed knowledge that, like a single
human being, if it wants to achieve a particular end, it knows how to
do so, as evidenced by Statute 2's (S2's) language. This technique
also at times appears to reflect justices' preference for objective or
plain meaning, with an expectation that the legislature will produce a
United States Code that is "a coherent and consistent product over
time."' 5
B. The Supreme Court's Use of the One-Congress Fiction
The United States Supreme Court has in recent years made fre-
quent use of the one-Congress fiction in its statutory interpretation
cases. The practice appears most frequently in the opinions ofJustice
Scalia, but he is not alone in adopting this interpretive methodology.
This section reviews a cross section of cases from the last decade in
which the Court used the one-Congress fiction. Three cases-Bennett
v. Spear,6 West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey,17 and FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.18 -are examined and reveal that dif-
ferent interpretive approaches and greater examination of historical
context often lead to different and more persuasive conclusions. The
Article then examines a handful of additional cases in which the one-
Congress fiction has been used, often in ways vulnerable to criticism.
This section, and the Article as a whole, focus primarily upon statutory
interpretation cases arising in connection with laws implicating struc-
tures and power in the administrative state.
1. Bennett v. Spea)s Multiple Statute Cross-Reference
In Bennett, one of the Supreme Court's many recent forays into
the law of standing,9 the Court unanimously concluded in an opinion
by Justice Scalia that a group of commercial water users in the West
satisfied both prudential "zone of interest" and constitutional standing
:5 Zeppos,Justice Scalia's Textualism, supra note 9, at 1621-22 (citation omitted).
16 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
17 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
18 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).
19 For a recent critique of the Supreme Court's politicized standing jurisprudence,
see RichardJ. Pierce,Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741 (1999).
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tests in bringing their challenge to water usage restrictions imposed in
light of Endangered Species Act ("ESA") requirements. The Court
thus allowed them to bring their challenge under the ESA's "citizen
suit" provision even though they were seeking to constrain agency ac-
tions designed to further protections for two endangered fish present
in reservoir waters." In contrast to recent cases in which Justice Scalia
found (or would have found) litigants to lack standing despite explicit
statutory conferral of a cause of action, Justice Scalia found in Bennett
that petitioners easily satisfied all standing criteria.
The one-Congress fiction interpretive methodology appears in the
Court's discussion of the "zone of interests" standing test.21 Most fed-
eral environmental laws contain citizen suit provisions, but their exact
language, while often similar, varies from statute to statute.2  The
Bennett Court inquired "whether the ESA's citizen-suit provi-
sion ... negates the zone-of-interests test (or, perhaps more accu-
rately, expands the zone of interests)."23 The Court concluded that it
did, justifying its determination by comparing the ESA to other statu-
tory provisions, predominately, but not exclusively, from the environ-
mental law area. Justice Scalia quoted the ESA's language-that "'any
person may commence a civil suit"-and stated that this is language
"of remarkable breadth when compared with the language Congress
ordinarily uses."24 He continued this interstatutory comparison, stat-
ing that "[e]ven in some other environmental statutes, Congress has
used more restrictive formulations, such as '[any person] having an
.I See 520 U.S. at 161-74. The lower court had found that due to the commercial
interests underlying these plaintiffs' challenge, they were not within the "zone of inter-
ests" manifest in the ESA, although they arguably fell within the textual letter of the
statute's broad citizen suit provision. See Bennett v. Plenert, No. 93-6076-HO, 1993 WL
669429, at *5 (D. Or. Nov. 18, 1993) ("[T]he recreational, aesthetic, and commercial
interests advanced by plaintiffs do not fall within the zone of interests sought to be
protected by ESA."). In responding to the lower court's opinion and the petitioners'
arguments against such an application of the prudential zone of interests test, Justice
Scalia was confronted with a garbled line of Supreme Court zone of interest cases, plus
a few other cases arising under the ESA in which he himself had written opinions re-
vealing both interpretive approaches to the Act and his approach to environmental
standing cases.
21 See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 165-66.
Reasons for such variation in this particular context, as well as in the general run
of cases, is explored in greater depth below, but the most obvious reasons for this
variation in similarly-operating provisions are their different years of enactment and
legislators' adoption of language that best dovetails with relevant background law as
revealed not just in other statutes' texts, but also in agency interpretations and judicial
opinions.
520 U.S. at 164.
Id. at 164-65.
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interest which is or may be adversely affected'" in the Clean Water Act
and similar language in the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act; "'[a]ny person suffering legal wrong"' in the Energy Supply and
Environmental Coordination Act; and "'any person having a valid le-
gal interest which is or may be adversely affected... whenever such
action constitutes a cases or controversy,"' as stated in the Ocean
Thermal Energy Conversion Act.25 He further contrasted the ESA's
language with language in statutes granting causes of action in the
context of unfair trade practices and other commercial matters."6
In the next paragraph, the Court further buttressed its conclusion
by looking at the purpose of this statutory provision. The Court stated
that much as the Court in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
2 7
allowed standing to allow citizen litigation "to the full extent permit-
ted by Article III by [a provision] of the Civil Rights Act of
1968... that authorized 'any person who claims to have been injured
by a discriminatory housing practice,' to sue for violations of the
Act,"28 the Court in Bennett feltjustified in similarly expanding pruden-
tial standing to the extent allowed by Article III: "[t]he statutory lan-
guage here is even clearer, and the subject of the legislation makes
the intent to permit enforcement by every man even more plausi-
ble.
,2 9
The Court's conclusion about the evident breadth of the ESA's
citizen suit language is well justified. The provision is broad and un-
narrowed by any qualifying language. The statute does manifest
strong legislative goals and explicitly seeks to enlist citizen action in
furtherance of its statutory goals. As the unanimous Court concluded,
the statute's text does not distinguish between citizens seeking to prod
government officials to take actions protecting endangered species
and citizens acting in furtherance of economic goals who seek to chal-
lenge government officials' actions. 3 What is far less self-evident than
25 Id. at 165.
26 Id.
27 409 U.S. 205 (1972), cited in Bennett 520 U.S. at 165-66.
28 Bennet 520 U.S. at 165-66.
29 Id. at 166. This comparison of the ESA to other statutes notably includes a ref-
erence to legislative "intent," not meaning, although in other contexts Justice Scalia
has shunned any references to legislative intent. See SCALIA, supra note 4, at 16-18
(criticizing interpretive methods that focus on legislative intent and arguing for a focus
on what the "lawgiver promulgated").
30 Although the Court's opinion discusses the ESA's broad citizen suit provision
and definition of "person[s]" authorized to bring or be the subject of such suits, the
opinion does not reflect any possible investigation into the actual history of this statu-
tory provision. The definition of "person" in 16 U.S.C. § 1532(c) was amended once
THE ONE-CONGRESS FICTION
assumed by the unanimous Court is that the various referent statutory
provisions reflect a different meaning, or a significantly different legis-
lative intent, namely to circumscribe the classes of allowable plain-
tiffs.M It is also far from obvious that this comparison appropriately
allows one to make a firmer conclusion about statutory meaning or
congressional intent. The Court merely compared statutory language
in isolated provisions, only considering the possible influence of its
own past statutory interpretations in its reference to Trafficante"
What would the Court have found if it had investigated the his-
torical roots of the ESA and the referent provisions alluded to in
Bennett? The Court's reference to statutes that both preceded and fol-
lowed the enactment of the ESA reveals a lack of concern with what
an ideal Congress would have considered or known in enacting the
ESA. Examination of the referent statutes' causes of action reveals vir-
tually no basis for the Court's comparison conclusions, and in fact
casts serious doubt on the appropriateness of the Court's apparent
conclusion or, rather, assumption, that these other provisions reveal a
legislative intent to use prudential standing hurdles to allow only a
more limited group of litigants into court.
The ESA's citizen suit provision and the linked definitional provi-
sions were both contained in the ESA as initially enacted in 1973 .
The Bennett opinion's cross-referenced provisions included several
statutes enacted after the ESA, provisions that thus could not have
been actually known to, or constructively known to, the Congress that
subsequent to the ESA's enactment in 1973 following a court decision limiting the
law's application to municipalities. See 134 CONG. REC. 18,571 (1988) (statement of
Senator Mitchell) (explaining the addition of this language as necessary to rectify ap-
pellate court's interpretation of the ESA in United States v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes,
841 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1988)).
11 References to legislative "intent" or statutory "meaning" are undoubtedly terms
of art that have led to the writing of many an article and opinion. This Article gener-
ally uses the term "meaning," but to avoid linguistic awkwardness at times refers to ju-
dicial attempts to discern legislative "intent." Justice Scalia himself, in Bennett, either
slips in referring to legislative "intent" or also finds such references on occasion to be
unavoidable. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
2 In construing the referent statutory provisions as narrower than the ESA for
.zone of interests" test purposes, the Court's use of the one-Congress fiction in Bennett
also provided dicta for future litigants or judges seeking to narrow the reach of those
referent provisions. See infra note 244 and accompanying text (discussing the risk that
dicta will unsettle existing law and empower politicized judges).
3 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 11, 87 Stat. 884 (1973)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (1994)). The definition of person was changed in minor
ways subsequent to 1973, but for purposes of the Bennett analysis and this Article's cri-
tique, the relevant language dates from 1973.
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enacted the ESA.34 If the Court is searching for a consistent interpre-
tive methodology, it cannot rest here on any actual or constructive
state of legislative knowledge. 5 The omniscient unitary concept noted
in past scholarship of Professors Zeppos and Popkin appears to as-
sume the fiction of a drafter who has knowledge of the past and fu-
ture, or at least drafts in an invariably coherent and consistent man-
36ner.
Putting to the side for the moment whether the one-Congress fic-
tion technique should ever include analysis of referents that post-date
the primary statute's disputed provision, analysis of the historical con-
text of most of these laws undercuts the Bennett Court's assumptions.
The environmental law engendering the greatest volume of citizen
litigation has been the Clean Water Act ("CWA") .3 The Bennett opin-
ion assumed that the provision of the CWA providing a citizen suit for
persons "having an interest which is or may be adversely affected "-ss re-
vealed a more narrowly crafted cause of action, or at least a legisla-
tively intended narrower "zone." The Court indicated that unlike the
ESA, the CWA does not reveal an intent to expand standing to the
limit of Article III constitutional criteria, and thus, by implication,
does not eliminate the "zone of interest" prudential hurdle as does
the ESA.39 The problem with this assumption is readily apparent when
s4 The referenced Surface Mining law dates from 1977, the Energy Supply statute
from 1974, and the Ocean Thermal law from 1980. See 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (1994)
(Surface Mining law); 15 U.S.C. § 797(b) (5) (1994) (Energy Supply statute); 42 U.S.C.
§ 9124(a) (1994) (Ocean Thermal law). The other referenced statutory provisions
pre-date the ESA.
35 For textualists, the elaboration of, and hewing to, a consistent interpretive
methodology is an important justification for their preferred mode of statutory con-
struction. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (Scalia, J.) ("What is of
paramount importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a background of
clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts.").
This textualist goal is explored by Jane S. Schacter in her article Metademocracy: The
Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 600 &
n.25 (1995) (referring to the above proposition articulated byJustice Scalia as "highly
questionable"). See infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text (exploring the rationale
for the use of consistent interpretive conventions).
36As discussed below, Justice Scalia has in other cases knowingly used one-
Congress fiction statutory referents that post-date the primary text. See, e.g., W. Va.
Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1991) (discussing his examination of
pre- and post-enactment referents and acknowledging that such a practice does not
rest on actual or constructive knowledge of a particular Congress: "how could an ear-
lier Congress know what a later Congress would enact?").
37 The Federal Water Pollution and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1384 (1994).
38 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1994).
39 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165 (1997) ("[1] n some other environmental
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one examines the historical context of the CWA's enactment. Floor
debates, committee reports, and legislative battles over proposed lan-
guage indicate that a narrower cause of action was considered but re-
jected.40 Perhaps of greater significance, an examination of the legis-
lative history as well as relevant law interpretations of coordinate
branches, here the Supreme Court's 1972 opinion in Sierra Club v.
Morton,4' reveal that the language chosen appears closely to parrot the
standing minima that had most recently been articulated by the Su-
preme Court prior to the CWA's enactment. Legislators indicated
knowledge of the Court's ruling that citizens suing must have suffered
"injury-in-fact." Even if one rejects the validity of any reference to
legislative history to glean statutory meaning, and instead analyzes
statutory language as it would have been understood at the time of
enactment, the Court's own articulation of standing prerequisites was
part of the historical context of the CWA's enactment and would have
been considered by an ideal drafter, as it apparently was in reality.43
statutes [besides the ESA], Congress has used more restrictive [standing] formulations,
such as '[any person) having an interest which is or may be adversely affected.' 33
U.S.C. § 1365(g) (Clean Water Act).").
V, The rejected language would have limited the definition of "citizen" to persons
who lived in the geographic area where a violation of the statute occurred and who
were directly affected by the violation, or groups participating in the administrative
proceedings surrounding a case. See H.R. 11896, 92d Cong. (1972), reprinted in H.R.
REP. No. 92-911, at 132-34 (1972). This restrictive language was removed at the con-
ference committee stage in favor of the language that ended up in the law. See S. REP.
No. 92-1236, at 146 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.CAN. 3668, 3823. One legislator's
floor statement expressed his support for removing the "very limiting restrictions the
House bill had placed on citizen suits" so as "not to prevent any legitimately concerned
citizen or group from bringing suit to prevent the law from being violated." 118
CONG. REC. 33,716 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
41 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (Stewart, J.) (holding that a person has standing to bring
suit under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") only if he himself has suffered or
will suffer an injury).
42 The Senate Conference Report explicitly referenced this case, stating that the
statutory language chosen was meant to "reflect" the Supreme Court's standing crite-
ria. S. REP. No. 92-1236, at 146. Senator Muskie, then Chairman of the Senate Sub-
committee on Air and Water Pollution and a conference committee member on the
CWA bill, explained the statutory language in terms much like that in Sierra Club.
"Thus under the language agreed to by the Conference a citizen suit may be brought
only by those persons or groups which are among those whose interest (whether envi-
ronmental or economic) is or may be injured by the violation of the Act." 118 CONG.
REc. 33,700 (1972) (statement of Sen. Muskie). In Sierra Club, the Court stated that
constitutionally sufficient injury in fact could include injuries to "aesthetic or environ-
mental well-being, like economic well-being." 405 U.S. at 734.
4,1 One quirk in this argument is that Sierra Club's articulation of the "injury-in-fact"
requirement and the types of interests that would suffice for standing arose in what
appears to have been a judicial construction of the APA's judicial review provisions.
405 U.S. at 734 ("We do not question that [aesthetic and ecological] harm may
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Furthermore, subsequent to the decision in Sierra Club, the Court
construed the CWA's language to "allow suits by all persons possessing
standing under this Court's decision in Sierra Club,"14 and discussed
CWA standing without any mention of prudential standing limitations
and with explicit reference to Article III as the only relevant standing
criterion. 4' Scholarly analyses of CWA citizen suits and lower court
opinions appear uniformly to have construed the CWA as only requir-
ing citizens to meet constitutional standing requirements.4 Bennett's
amount to an 'injury in fact' sufficient to lay the basis for standing under § 10 of the
APA."). Subsequent to Sierra Club, the Court has stated that the "injury-in-fact" is and
has been the constitutional minimum for standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (articulating this proposition). At the time of Sierra Club, it
appears that most courts and likely most legislators did not foresee that the Constitu-
tion would act as a barrier to standing if Congress had conferred an explicit cause of
action. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan ? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and
Article ll, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 163, 193 (1992) ("[During the time it enacted several citi-
zen-suit provisions,] Congress did not.., devote much attention to the constitutional-
ity of citizen standing, and the issue was to remain open for many years."). For exten-
sive citation to many articles critiquing Lujan, see William W. Buzbee, Expanding the
Zone, Tilting the Field: Zone of Interests and Article 1H7 Standing Analysis After Bennett v.
Spear, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 763,790 n.138 (1997).
44 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 16
(1981).
45 Id. In Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, the Court further
analyzed the CWA's citizen suit provision as limited only by the now established Article
III threshold. 484 U.S. 49, 56-67 (1987) (discussing the CWA and standing, and mak-
ing reference to Article III without mention of prudential standing limitations).
46 1 use the term "appear" because a few cases finesse the meaning of Sierra Club by
referring to its standing criteria, but without identifying the injury-in-fact requirement
as either APA-based or constitutionally derived. No case of which this author is aware,
however, has ever construed the GWA as enacting a citizen suit provision that provides
additional prudential standing criteria on top of the now constitutional injury-in-fact
test. See, e.g., Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc.,
123 F.3d 111, 122 (3d Cir. 1997) (interpreting the "adversely affected" language of the
CWA citizen suit provision as limiting standing to the "injury prong of the constitu-
tional test"); Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals
Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 70 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990) (explicitly disregarding prudential standing
limitations within the CWA citizen suit context based on the legislative history sur-
rounding the Act); Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Am. Recovery Co., 769 F.2d 207, 209
(4th Cir. 1985) (assuming that the standing requirements for a "citizen" under the
CWA were meant to be coextensive with the Morton test); Sierra Club v. SCM Corp.,
747 F.2d 99, 104-05 (2d Cir. 1984) (concluding that the CWA's definition of "citizen"
for purposes of standing applies to all persons who meet the injury-in-fact test enunci-
ated in Morton); Gonzales v. Gorsuch, 688 F.2d 1263, 1266-68 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting
that there is a "liberal personal stake requirement applicable to environmental plain-
tiffs" and assessing CWA citizen suit standing under the Morton injury-in-fact test with-
out mentioning prudential considerations).
District court decisions reflect the same interpretation. See, e.g., Student Pub. In-
terest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1479, 1484 (D.NJ.
1985) (holding that an environmental organization had standing to sue under the
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cross-reference to the CWA as evidencing a narrower citizen suit cause
of action, apparently subject to prudential limitations not relevant
under the ESA, thus contradicts legislative history, is contrary to the
historical context created by the Court's own standing discussions,
and contradicts both the Court's own construction of standing under
CWA itself and apparently uniform lower court case law. In short,
had the Court engaged in a more rigorous contextual analysis, it
should have found that, despite slightly different CWA language, the
referent CWA provision means exactly what the Bennett Court inter-
preted the ESA provision to mean."'
While the legislative history, historical context, and judicial prece-
dents surrounding the other statutory referents in Bennett are more
limited than those related to the CWA, they too overwhelmingly con-
tradict the Bennett opinion's implication. For example, the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act ("SMCRA") contains a citizen
suit provision enacted in 1977 that contains the same language as the
CWVA citizen suit provision based on Morton and its injury-in-fact test); United States v.
Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 540 F. Supp. 1067, 1080-81 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding
that plaintiff intervenors met the definition of "citizen" for CWA standing purposes
because they met the Morton requirement of injury-in-fact); Michigan v. City of Allen
Park, 501 F. Supp. 1007, 1013 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (finding that citizens and construc-
tion companies had standing under CWA citizen suit provision based on the require-
ments of Morton);J.E. Brenneman Co. v. Schramm, 473 F. Supp. 1316, 1320 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (finding that plaintiff contractor lacked standing under CWA citizen suit provi-
sion because it did not meet Morton injury-in-fact requirement); Montgomery Envti.
Coalition v. Fri, 366 F. Supp. 261, 264 (D.D.C. 1973) (holding that plaintiff community
groups had standing under CWA citizen suit provision based on analysis under the
Morton rubric); Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258, 264 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (denying
standing based on lack of plaintiffs' establishment of injury-in-fact). Most scholars ad-
dressing the issue have concluded that in CWA cases, the injury-in-fact test is the
threshold standing requirement and that prudential limits do not apply. See, e.g.,
JEFFREY G. MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION
COT,1ROL Lws 22 (1987) (stating that the Supreme Court has interpreted standing
under the CWA by applying the Morton standard); Robert B. June, The Structure of
Standing Requirements for Citizen Suits and the Scope of Congressional Power, 24 ENVTL. L.
761, 769 (1994) (articulating this view); Katherine B. Steuer & Robin L. Juni, Note,
Court Access for Environmental Plaintiffs: Standing Doctrine in Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, 15 FLRV. ENvnL. L. REv. 187, 193 (1991) (same).
47 See supra note 46 (citing cases contradicted by the Bennett decision's interpreta-
tion of citizen suit).
Furthermore, the Trafficante cause of action's conferral of standing to "any per-
son who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice," Civil Rights
Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 810(a) (1968), was construed in that case to provide standing
to the extent allowed by Article III. That language appears to be equally amenable to
an interpretation that it too creates a limited "zone," but the Court somehow found
this linguistic difference insignificant, while inexplicably holding in Bennett that the
CWA's equally minor dissimilarity is important. For a discussion of Trafficante, see su-
pra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
20001
188 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 149:171
CWA. SMCRA's legislative history reveals an intent that the provision
"shall be construed to be coterminous with the broadest standing re-
quirements enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court., 49 Historical con-
text, in particular case law discussing the contours of citizen suit stand-
ing, largely tracks the case law discussing the CWA; no case then
decided had ever interpreted language like that in the SMCRA to re-
veal a statutory intent to create prudential hurdles to standing.0 Most
case law subsequent to SMCRA's enactment has focused on this citi-
zen suit language as leaving only constitutional standing criteria as a
hurdle for citizen suit plaintiffs.5 1 Though the other referent statutes
provide less grist for the Court's conclusion or this Article's discus-
sion, they similarly appear to have been cited based on little more
than the Court's impressions.52
49 H.R. REP. No. 95-218, at 90 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.CA.N. 593, 626. In
the bill's conference report, there is no indication of debate or contention regarding
this provision or its reach. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 95-493, at 97 (1977), reprinted in
1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 728, 729. In fact, critics of the bill were aware of the breadth of the
citizen provision and criticized statutory language for that reason. See H.R. REP. No.
95-218, at 193.
M See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (discussing Sierra Club and post-
CWA enactment cases interpreting the Constitution to be the only standing hurdle
relevant to CWA citizen suits).
51 See, e.g., Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Interior, 70 F.3d 1345, 1349
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (discussing the need "to establish the 'irreducible constitutional
minimum of standing'" (citations omitted)); Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Bab-
bitt, 54 F.3d 1477, 1485 (10th Cir. 1995) (focusing upon only constitutional standing
requirements); Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 752 F.2d 1554, 1558 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (stating that "[a]s the title 'citizen's suit' implies, the object of writing the provi-
sion was to assure access to the courts by 'private attorneys general' whose standing was
as tenuous as the Supreme Court would permit," that is, as limited only by Article III).
One court sees "zone" analysis as still relevant under SMCRA. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n
v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 704 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
52 The Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act ("ESECA") used "suf-
fering legal wrong" language, 15 U.S.C. § 797(b) (5) (1994), but like the CWA and
SMCRA, this 1974 enactment was drafted shortly after Sierra Club, and its chosen lan-
guage comports with that case's standing approach as partially lifted from the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. Little pre- or post-enactment debate or history sheds light on
why this language was chosen, but, conversely, nothing in this language or history indi-
cates an intent to limit standing. See, for example, the APA's general "right of review"
provision, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994) (stating that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because
of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the mean-
ing of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof") (emphasis added). For
a discussion of opinions construing and distinguishing this and other APA language,
see STEPHEN BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 875, 881-82
(4th ed. 1999). The citizen suit provision in the Ocean Thermal Conversion Act
("OTECA"), enacted in 1980, also appears to closely track constitutional standing min-
ima. See 42 U.S.C. § 9124(a) (1994) (stating that "any person having a valid legal in-
terest which is or may be adversely affected may commence a civil action.., whenever
THE ONE-CONGRESS FICTION
2. West Virginia University Hospitals v. Casey.
Deliberate Historical Disregard
Justice Scalia's opinion for a divided Court in West Virginia Hospi-
tals v. Casey reveals once again the one-Congress fiction in action.
Perhaps even more interestingly, the Court in Casey acknowledged its
decision to ignore historical materials contradicting the conclusions it
reached by reference to text alone.4 In its conclusions and in its
methodology, the Court rejected the more context-based opinion of
Judge Posner in Friedrich v. City of Chicago.5  The issue in Casey was
whether a prevailing civil rights litigant was entitled to recover expert
witness fees as part of the attorney's fees explicitly made awardable
such action constitutes a case or controversy"). The limited legislative history indicates
only that this section follows "the standard procedures for civil procedures and judicial
review." S. REP. No. 96-721, at 9 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2407, 2415.
There is no reported case law construing this somewhat obscure provision. The other
statutes referenced by Justice Scalia in Bennett-a 1968 agricultural law, a 1916 anti-
dumping law, and a 1906 gold and silver stamping law to which a citizen suit provision
was added in 1970, do appear to reveal a limited number of citizens who were granted
a cause of action, but in language and in statutory contexts that may reflect more who
would be likely to want to sue than an intent to create prudential barriers to suits.
Compare The Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1968, 7 U.S.C. § 2305(c) (1994) (defin-
ing citizen as "any person injured in his business or property"), and The Anti-Dumping
Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1994) (same), withThe National Gold and Silver Stamping
Act of 1906, 15 U.S.C. § 298(b) (1994) (defining citizen as "any competitor, customer,
or competitor of a customer of any person" in violation of the Act).
53 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
4 Id. at 97-101. For a pointed and thorough critique of Casey and a skeptical as-
sessment of whether an interest in textualism actually motivated justice Scalia to reach
his conclusions, as well as a more thorough investigation into the historical context of
Casey, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore M. Shaw, The Costs of Incoherence: A
Comment on Plain Meaning, West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, and Due
Process of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 687 (1992).
55 888 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1989), vacated, 499 U.S. 933 (1991) (vacated in light of
Casey). Judge Posner's opinion for a unanimous Seventh Circuit declined to engage in
interstatutory textual comparison of the type criticized in this Article as "the one-
Congress fiction." In addition to pointing out the unrealistic assumptions of omnis-
cience implied by drawing inferences from such textual comparisons, 888 F.2d at 517,
Posner responded to litigant arguments that "repeals by implication are disfavored" in
terms akin to the logic suggested in this Article: such an interpretive approach "pro-
tects some old statutes from, as it were, inadvertent destruction, but it threatens to im-
pale new statutes on the concealed stakes planted by old ones," id. at 516. He exam-
ined the history of the primary statute at issue and relied on the logic and language of
his opinion in Edwards v. United States, 814 F.2d 486, 488 (7th Cir. 1987), to reject ar-
guments against allowing a shifting of expert expenses. An additional reason he of-
fered for rejecting text-to-text comparisons is stated in Edwards: "forgotten statutes
lurking in the statute book, plus remembered statutes that have acquired non-obvious
meanings through a process ofjudicial or regulatory interpretation, will make the body
of unrepealed statutes a minefield for [a] new law." Id. at 488 (cited in Fiedrich, 888
F.2d at 516).
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under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).56 The Court held that prevailing
plaintiffs could not recover such expenses. 7
The statutory provisions at issue in Casey concededly did not con-
tain explicit language that courts should award expert expenses to
prevailing plaintiffs. To buttress the majority's conclusion that this
omission was significant, Justice Scalia contrasted § 1988 and its omis-
sion of any reference to expert fee shifting with numerous other stat-
utes from times before and after § 1988's enactment in 1976. These
statutory referents contain language explicitly authorizing awards of
expert-related expenses to prevailing parties. 8 In addition, the gen-
eral statute setting forth when and what a 'Judge or clerk of any court
may tax as costs," also lacks any general authorization for courts to
award expert expenses except to the extent that experts might be en-
titled to nominal witness "attendance fees." 9 The Court then cited
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, a 1987 case in which it had, in the
words of the Casey opinion, articulated a "clear statement" rule that
"these provisions define the full extent of a federal court's power to
shift litigation costs absent express statutory authority to go further."O°
In support of his conclusion, Justice Scalia referred to a huge
number of statutes that explicitly allow the award of expert expenses.
He gave little attention, however, to what Professors Aleinikoff and
Shaw have called the "vertical critique" of a law. In contrast to a
"horizontal critique" that focuses on comparisons to other bodies of
law, a "vertical critique" focuses on the history of a particular statute.61
56 Both before and after Casey, § 1988 was subject to legislative amendments, in-
cluding a post-decision amendment that in part undid the effect of Casey. See
Aleinikoff & Shaw, supra note 54, at 697-98 (citing and discussing the effect of The
Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 113, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071).
57 Casey, 499 U.S. at 102.
58 See id. at 88-89 & n.4 (identifying "[a] t least 34 statutes" that "explicitly shift at-
torney's fees and expert witness fees").
59 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) (1994), discussed in Casey, 499 U.S. at 86-87.
6o Casey, 499 U.S. at 86 (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S.
437 (1987)).
61 See Aleinikoff & Shaw, supra note 54, at 697 ("[T]he Court's opinion in Casey is
subject to... a 'vertical' critique (that it ignores the easy-to-read history of Section
1988)."). Aleinikoff and Shaw criticize the absence of a "horizontal critique" focused
on how Congress generally has dealt with expert expense awards in other civil rights
laws. Id. ("(T] he Court's opinion in Casey is [also] subject to a... 'horizontal' critique
(that it is simply not plausible that Congress would award expert fees in other areas of
the law but intentionally deny them in civil rights cases covered by Section 1988).").
For a similar distinction between horizontal and vertical critiques, see Eskridge, supra
note 9, at 678-79 (employing these terms in criticizing the statutory interpretation of
Justice Scalia); Zeppos,Justice Scalia's Textualism, supra note 9, at 1615, 1620-22 (using
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Most significantly, as argued inJustice Stevens's dissent, legislative his-
tory provided strong evidence that ran counter to Justice Scalia's in-
ferences. The legislative history, as well as abundant case law prece-
dents, revealed a concern for making civil rights plaintiffs whole and
thereby removing financial deterrents to the initiation of such litiga-
tion.' 1 Legislative history also indicated that the 1976 version of
§ 1988 was intended by at least some legislators to restore the law to its
state prior to the Court's 1975 ruling in Alyeska Pipeline v. Wilderness
Society. 6  There the Court rejected what Justice Scalia conceded was
the practice of "many courts": "award[ing] expert fees and attorney's
fees in certain circumstances pursuant to their equitable discretion.""'
Moreover, in Missouri v. Jenkins,6- a 1989 case regarding the very same
statute but in the context of a claim for recovery of time expended by
paralegals and law clerks, the Court construed the statute to allow
such awards despite the absence of explicit authorizing language.66
Justice Scalia explained his conclusion thatJenkins did not compel
a similar conclusion in Casey by pointing out that unlike expert ex-
pense provisions that appear in many statutes, the Court did "not
know of a single statute that shifts clerk or paralegal fees separately."67
similarly the concept of "horizontal" statutory analysis).
&il See Casey, 499 U.S. at 108-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Whether this evidence of
legislator and judicial concern, or perhaps intent, should appropriately be given inter-
pretive weight is another question and is explored more in the parts below. For a con-
cise and powerful argument for why "legislative intent" is an oxymoron, see Kenneth A.
Shepsle, Congress is a "They,"Not an "It: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. OF
L. & ECON. 239 (1992) (building upon Arrow's Theorem to explore the impossibility
of there ever being an intent of a collective and procedurally complex body such as
Congress).
421 U.S. 240 (1975).
C Casey, 499 U.S. at 97 (citing Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 269); see also 499 U.S. at
108-11 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (reviewing legislative history reflecting legislators' and
committees' intent to undo the effect of Alyeska); Aleinikoff & Shaw, supra note 54, at
694-98 (discussing the impact of Alyeska and the legislative response to the decision).
6 491 U.S. 274 (1989) (holding that the fees for paralegals and clerks should be
awarded based on their market value).
66 For a particularly insightful discussion of the same issue as was before the Casey
Court, including a dialogue on the implication of Jenkins, previous assumptions about
courts' equitable powers to shift various sorts of costs and the implications of the legis-
lative response to Alyeska, see Friedrich v. Ciy of Chicago, 888 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Posner, J.), discussed supra note 55. Judge Posner also commented critically and at
length about "plain meaning" interpretive approaches and distinguished problems
with reliance on legislative history, particularly individuals' statements, contrasted with
the ongoing value of attention to historical context. Id. at 513-19.
", 499 U.S. at 99. Interestingly, although neither the Casey majority nor the dissent
note this fact, the record of Jenkins reveals that in that case the fee and cost award of
the district court and court of appeals included expert witness fees despite Missouri's
contesting of such an award. See Aleinikoff & Shaw, supra note 54, at 696 (discussing
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Responding to the dissents' criticisms of his opinion for failing to ex-
amine legislative history and the common pre-Alyeska practice of
awarding expert expenses to civil rights plaintiffs, Justice Scalia re-
sponded that "Congress could easily have shifted 'attorney's fees and
expert witness fees,' or 'reasonable litigation expenses,' as it did in
contemporaneous statutes; it chose instead to enact more restrictive
language, and we are bound by that restriction."6
In contrast to most other Supreme Court cases in which the one-
Congress fiction has been used without explanation, Justice Scalia set
forth a brief explanation for his interstatutory references, but in this
case at least using the plural term "Congresses."" He stated that the
Court construes a statutory term "to contain that permissible meaning
which fits most logically and comfortably into the body of both previ-
ously and subsequently enacted law."70 The Court's task, in Justice
Scalia's view, is "to make sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus
juris. But where, as here, the meaning of the term prevents such ac-
commodation, it is not our function to eliminate clearly expressed in-
consistency of policy and to treat alike subjects that different Con-
gresses have chosen to treat differently."7' As he has in many cases,
Justice Scalia refused to consider legislative history or examination of
historical context, instead relying on "the statutory text adopted by
both Houses of Congress and submitted to the President. ' M  Despite
this brief explanation, Justice Scalia provided no real explanation for
his interpretive conclusion that the absence of a provision allowing or
encouraging expert expense awards is equivalent to a prohibition on
such an award, even where the primary statute explicitly authorizes fee
shifting.
this feature of Jenkins byAgjei v. Missouri, 838 F.2d 260, 266 (8th Cir. 1988)).
Casey, 499 U.S. at 99.
69 Id. at 101.
7o Id. at 100 (citation omitted).
7 Id. at 101. He continued by stating that the "facile attribution of congressional
'forgetfulness' cannot justify such a usurpation.... In such circumstances, the attribu-
tion of forgetfulness rests in reality upon the judge's assessment that the later statute
contains the better disposition." Id
72 Id. at 98. In this discussion, Justice Scalia's rhetoric closely tracks the writings of
Judge Frank Easterbrook. See, e.g., Continental Can Co. v. Chicago Truck Drivers,
Helpers & Warehouse Workers Union (Independent) Pension Fund, 916 F.2d 1154,
1157 (7th Cir. 1990) ("The text of the statute, and not the private intent of the legisla-
tors, is the law."); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHi. L. REV. 533, 544-
49 (1983) (stating that the domain of the statute should be restricted to cases expressly
resolved in the legislative process). These writings are discussed in Shepsle, supra note
62, at 253 n.24).
73 Justice Scalia undoubtedly placed great weight upon the background "American
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Casey thus offers a partial explanation for the one-Congress fiction
interpretive methodology, namely the Court's obligation to make
sense of the corpus juris. The majority's failure to afford significant
weight to legislative history also reveals the now familiar shunning of
legislator statements and committee report discussions, even if they
directly contradict a text-based conclusion. Furthermore, as in
Bennett, the Case, decision appears to disregard different kinds of
statutory history that are arguably not subject to manipulation, namely
pre-enactment practices of courts, presumptions in related bodies of
case, regulatory, or statutory law (here civil rights cases and laws), and
the chronology of court decisions and statutory responses.74 Instead,
the Court favored simpler text-to-text comparisons. It devoted no at-
tention to the particular pre-enactment contexts of the many referent
statutes cited by Justice Scalia. Different statutory drafting strategies
in different fields and different pre-enactmentjudicial practices were
neither examined nor considered.
To the Casey dissenters, as most thoroughly articulated by Justice
Stevens, the Court should have looked to the prevailing practice of
courts in civil rights cases, the legislative response to Alyeska, and legis-
lator and committee statements. It also should have cited materials
reflecting the 1976 amendment of § 1988 as a response to Alyeska, the
general purpose of § 1988 and similar civil rights laws, and the related
policy of making civil rights plaintiffs whole. For Justice Stevens,
rather than examining other statutes in unrelated fields, and reading
an omission as a prohibition, the Court should have focused on "the
way in which the Court has interpreted the text of this statute in the
past, as well as this statute's legislative history."" He also looked to pol-
icy-based considerations and the majority's creation of an odd incen-
tive for over-billing by attorneys who now could not rely on experts
76and recover associated expenses.
rule," which presumptively disfavors fee shifting, but he did not explain why such a
rule should still prevail when a statute contains an explicit authorization of attorney's
fees and cost shifting but leaves expert expenses unaddressed. He construed this omis-
sion as equivalent to an intentional preclusion, in effect making the "American rule"
fully effective for other litigation expenses whether a statute omits any reference to fee
shifting or authorizes shifting of attorney's fees and costs. See 499 U.S. at 99.
As shown in Part IA, infra, the Court does at times engage in interstatutory refer-
encing with attention to more than mere text.
499 U.S. at 103 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
See id. at 106-08 ("If attorneys were forced to do the work that paralegals could
just as easily perform under the supervision of an attorney .... then 'it would not be
surprising to see a greater amount of such work performed by attorneys themselves,
thus increasing the overall cost of litigation.'" (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S.
274, 288 n.10 (1989))).
20001
194 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 149:171
3. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.: Devaluing Text
and Privileging Post-Enactment Legislative Activity
The Court's recent opinion in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp-7 contains arguments and logic that fall squarely within this Arti-
cle's discussion of the one-Congress fiction. In other respects, how-
ever, the opinion and the case's posture make it distinguishable from
most examples of this interpretive methodology. In reaching the con-
clusion that the FDA lacked authority to regulate cigarettes and other
tobacco products, Justice O'Connor analyzed numerous statutory en-
actments regarding tobacco that post-date the primary enabling act at
issue, examined numerous forms of legislative history, and gave re-
duced attention to the key statute's text. The identity of the regula-
tory target of the numerous statutes compared by Justice O'Connor
makes the FDA tobacco case distinguishable from cases like Bennett
and Casey in which diverse, unrelated statutes regulating different tar-
gets were compared based on similarities in their language or regula-
tory mechanisms.78 Nevertheless, the Brown & Williamson majority
opinion contains an essential strain of logic that looks at Congress as a
unitary, unchanging principal revisiting its own work and thereby
shedding light on the meaning of the much earlier law relied on by
the FDA. Both for its similarities and dissimilarities to other one-
Congress fiction cases, this case provides material that illuminates the
present discussion.
The FDA's 1996 assertion of authority to regulate tobacco was
based on its construction of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
("FD CA"), as enacted in 1938.'9 The agency relied heavily on early
77 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000).
78 A further distinction is the FDA tobacco opinion's tendency not to parse particu-
lar linguistic formulations in compared statutes, but to focus on general regulatory
domains and strategies evident in tobacco laws enacted since 1938.
798gPub. L. No. 52-675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§
301-95 (1994)). The FDA's assertion of regulatory authority is found at 61 Fed. Reg.
44619-5318 (1996). For critiques of the 1996 FDA assertion of authority to regulate
tobacco products, see Richard A. Merrill, The FDA May Not Regulate Tobacco Products as
"Drugs" or as "MedicalDevices, "47 DUKE LJ. 1071, 1093 (1998) (featuring arguments by
a law professor who also served as tobacco counsel, and concluding that "Congress did
not give the FDAjurisdiction over tobacco products.... And on the several occasions
when Congress considered its options, it made conscious decisions to deal with the
subject in other ways, through different instruments"), and Lars Noah & Barbara A.
Noah, Nicotine Withdrawak Assessing the IDA's Effort to Regulate Tobacco Products, 48 ALA.
L. REV. 1, 7 (1996) ("[T]he FDA regulations exceed the Agency's delegated author-
ity."). But see Cass R Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law
Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1019 (1998) ("[R]eviewing courts should uphold the regula-
tion, principally by reference to the appropriate role of contemporary administrative
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1990s revelations that tobacco companies were knowingly using ciga-
rettes as a means to deliver "'a day's supply of nicotine."' 8 Subsequent
to 1938, Congress had enacted numerous statutes that regulated vari-
ous aspects of the tobacco industry and tobacco products, while the
FDA declined to regulate tobacco products. In Brown & Williamson,
the tobacco industry challengers, the FDA, other partisans, and the
majority and dissenting Supreme Court Justices differed in their as-
sessments of what the 1938 statute authorized, the implications of the
FDA's decision not to assert regulatory authority over tobacco prod-
ucts, and the significance of the post-1938 legislative activity.
Justice O'Connor's opinion, joined without qualification by textu-
alistJustices Scalia and Thomas (as well as by Chief Justice Rehnquist
andJustice Kennedy), roamed widely in looking at legislative materials
viewed as relevant to the question of the FDA's authority. Far from a
text-limited analysis, this opinion delved into the very forms of legisla-
tive history usually shunned by textualists, including quotations of
witnesses at legislative hearings, individual legislator and regulator
statements, and histories of both enacted and unenacted bills that
post-dated the 1938 law on which the FDA based its jurisdiction."'
Furthermore, the majority reached a conclusion contrary to that most
easily justified based on textual analysis.82 Based on its evaluation of
the FDCA text, an array of legislative materials, and a limited parsing
of interrelated statutory texts, the majority determined that Congress
did not grant the FDA authority to regulate tobacco products."3 The
agencies.").
120 S. Ct. at 1321-22 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also id. at
1320-22 (quoting various scientists' statements regarding nicotine's effects and the use
of cigarettes as a means to deliver nicotine and satisfy consumers' desire for "drug ac-
tion").
h See id. at 1300-13 (considering, for example, the 1964 testimony of the Surgeon
General that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare lacked the authority to
label cigarette packages under the existing law governing the FDA). The case is un-
usual in that the textualists silently joined a majority opinion that went far beyond text-
based analysis to rely on diverse forms of legislative history created over several dec-
ades.
U The dissent criticized the majority for failing to give adequate weight to that
which the majority "nowhere denies": that the statute's language and purpose support
the FDA assertion ofjurisdiction over tobacco. Id. at 1316-17, 1319-21 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting).
h- The Court's analysis of the FDCA itself is unusual in its structure and a bit elu-
sive in its logic. As the dissent rightly pointed out, the majority nowhere denied that
the FDCA's text by its terms conferred on the FDA power to act as it did (although
without mentioning tobacco in its text). Id. at 1316 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Instead,
the majority's logic %-as that the FDA lacks its asserted power because if tobacco could
be regulated as a "drug," "device," or "combination product," then the FDCA would
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Court also added what appears to be a new context for application of
the clear statement doctrine: "we are confident that Congress could
not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and politi-
cal significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.",
4
The one-Congress fiction logic pervades the opinion, with Justice
O'Connor repeatedly referring to how Congress subsequent to 1938
"spoke[]," revealing and confirming through subsequent legislative
activities that the FDA lacked its asserted regulatory authority. 5 These
activities and enactments shed light, according to the majority, on
whether the 1938 statute actually reflected a congressional grant of
FDA authority to regulate tobacco. As the Court stated, the "collective
premise" of numerous post-1938 tobacco laws "is that cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco will continue to be sold in the United States. ' 86
The Court therefore concluded that the 1938 law, plus seven subse-
quent tobacco-regulating laws, reveal that "Congress has created a dis-
tinct regulatory scheme to address the problem of tobacco and health,
and that scheme, as presently constructed, precludes any role for the
FDA.
87
These conclusions are supported by both persuasive and uncon-
vincing logic. The majority's strongest argument is that the FDA's
1996 assertion of power to regulate tobacco advertising contradicted
the implications of post-1938 laws. As the majority noted, "[t]he regu-
lation of product labeling... is an integral aspect of the FDCA,"' yet
post-1938 tobacco laws prohibited any cigarette packaging statements
other than that required by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Adver-
require the FDA to ban tobacco products, or at least cigarettes. Id. at 1301-03. Rather
than holding that the FDA's error was therefore in its choice of regulatory or remedial
option, the majority concluded that post-enactment history, including both subsequent
laws and a wide variety of legislative and regulatory statements of individuals, revealed
a legislative assumption that tobacco products would continue to be sold. Id. at 1303-
06. Therefore, under the majority's logic, the FDA could not have the jurisdiction over
tobacco that it claimed. Id. at 1306. The dissent argued that if the majority was correct
about the FDA's jurisdiction, then the Court should merely have faulted the FDA's
chosen limited remedy and instead have required the banning of tobacco products.
Id. at 1322-23 (BreyerJ., dissenting). The dissent also argued, however, that the FDA
had remedial discretion and a broader set of regulatory options than concluded by the
majority. Id. at 1322-26 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
84 Id. at 1315.
85 See, e.g., id. at 1301 ("Congress has directly spoken to the issue here and pre-
cluded the FDA's jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products.").
8 Id. at 1304.
87 Id. at 1307.
88 Id. at 1309.
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tising Act ("FCLAA"). 8 1 The FCLAA and other statutes regulating to-
bacco revealed, according to the majority, a Congress "reserving ex-
clusive control over both subjects to itself."0 Congress's repeated for-
ays into tobacco regulation gave the majority a tenable basis for
concluding, as several legislators had asserted in legislative history
quoted by the Court, that "'further regulation in this... complex area
must be reserved for specific Congressional action."'9'1 The Court
soundly saw itself as unavoidably thrust into a dispute where it had to
look at how various laws pertaining to tobacco and FDA authority in-
terrelated: "the meaning of one statute may be affected by other Acts,
particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and more spe-
cifically to the topic at hand."92
The Court also, however, engaged in several questionable inter-
pretive approaches. The Court's heavy emphasis on the FDA's long-
time declination to regulate tobacco products is of questionable logic.
The majority read FDA statements declining to regulate tobacco as re-
flecting an FDA belief that it could never assert such authority, but as
the dissent argued, the FDA's official regulatory acts (versus scattered
statements by individual FDA regulators) revealed an agency that for
years either lacked the political will or factual basis to regulate tobacco
products. As the FDA asserted in 1995, new evidence of internal in-
dustry acknowledgments of nicotine's effects and discussions of ciga-
rettes as a means to deliver nicotine constituted new information that,
in its view, sufficed to give the FDA the factual basis to assertjurisdic-
tion that it had previously lacked. Based primarily on textual analysis
X9 Pub. L. 89-92, 79 Star. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41
(1994)).
Brown & lIlliamson, 120 S. Ct. at 1309.
91 Id. at 1310 (quoting S. REP. No. 94-251, at 43 (1975) (delineating the views of
Sens. Hartke, Hollings, Ford, Stevens, and Beall)). The Court also quoted an individ-
ual legislator's floor statement about a bill's relationship to a controversial district
court opinion, see id. ("the 'legislation, in effect, reverse[d]' the District Court's deci-
sion," (quoting the acknowledgement of Sen. Moss, 121 CONG. REc. 23,563 (1975))),
as well as a letter sent in 1980 by the FDA Commissioner Goyan, see id. ("[T]he FDA
later observed that the episode was 'particularly' 'indicative of the policy of Congress
to limit the regulatory authority over cigarettes by Federal Agencies.'" (quoting Letter
from Commissioner Goyan, FDA, to Executive Director Banzhaf, Action on Smoking
and Health (Nov. 25, 1980)) (citation omitted)).
" Id. at 1301 (citing United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 530-31
(1998); United States ,. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988)).,,- For a review of this new evidence, see Sunstein, supra note 79, at 1025-26, dis-
cussing revelations concerning the number of deaths caused by tobacco, ways in which
"tobacco affects the structure or function of the body," and when knowledge of these
effects was gained. For a similar discussion, see Brown & Williamon, 120 S. Ct. at 1321-
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and careful parsing of the FDA's statements regarding its power to
regulate tobacco, coupled with heavy emphasis on the facts revealed
in the 1990s about tobacco industry knowledge and research regard-
ing nicotine, the dissenters contended that the FDA had an adequate
basis for its decision to regulate tobacco. 4
The majority's and dissenters' careful examinations of a wide vari-
ety of legislative sources in determining whether the FDA actually pos-
sessed its asserted authority constitutes a welcome contrast to one-
Congress fiction cases, such as Casey, where the Court utterly failed or
even refused to examine the historical context of a disputed statutory
provision.' As this Article advocates, all members of the Court in
Brown & Williamson manifested comfort with viewing statutory enact-
ments as the product of a complex ongoing political conversation
among the legislative branch, agency officials, the courts, and regula-
tory partisans. One might question the Court's self-avowed textualists
for their possibly ends-oriented willingness to abandon their meth-
odological purity to reach a result contrary to that called for by more
text-dependent modes of interpretation. Such general agreement
among the justices on recourse to a wide array of sources of authority,
however, is unusual with the Court's current personnel and deserves
praise. How the majority used these sources of authority, however,
deserves criticism even if the Court's conclusion is a close question.
The majority's reliance on the idea that there is one Congress is
once again questionable. The 1938 law relied upon by the FDA in
1996 was, injustice O'Connor's view, aimed at more routine FDA tar-
gets, with little attention to, or expectation that, consumer tobacco
products would be regulated by the FDA." The language of that stat-
ute, however, appears well suited to the agency's assertion ofjurisdic-
tion, providing the FDA with authority to regulate "articles (other
than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the
body."97 The majority missteps in taking scattered post-1938 legislator
and regulator statements about the FDA's earlier decisions not to as-
sertjurisdiction as reflecting a view that it could never do so, or as evi-
dencing an agreement between the FDA and Congress that the agency
could not do so. To take isolated statements by various regulatory and
22 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
94 Brown & Williamson, 120 S. Ct. at 1316-31 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
95 See supra notes 53-76 and accompanying text.
See Brown & Williamson, 120 S. Ct. at 1316 ("Reading the FDCA as a whole.., it
is plain that Congress has not given the FDA the authority that it seeks to exercise
here.").
97 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (1) (C) (1994).
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legislative stakeholders, especially regarding proposed post-1938 laws,
as revealing what the 1938 law means remains an illogical use of the
one-Congress fiction and in fact closely resembles dynamic modes of
statutory interpretation.98 In addition, the majority's combining of in-
terstatutory cross-referencing, as is the essence of the one-Congress
fiction, with recourse to a wide array of legislative history and
stakeholder comments about a wide array of laws, proposed laws, and
regulatory activity, adds up to a remarkably manipulable set of data for
interpretation. That individual regulators and legislators over the
years would repeatedly voice positions in line with the tobacco indus-
try's preference for no FDA regulation is unsurprising. What is as-
tounding is that the Court, including the Court's purported textual-
ists, would quote and rely so heavily upon such statements while giving
little weight to the key enabling act text.
As further discussed below, debate surrounding these newer laws
and other proposed bills and regulations should not have been relied
upon to construe the FDA's authority under the 1938 law. Greater at-
tention instead should have been paid to pre-1938 historical context,
coupled with attention to how actually-enacted tobacco statutes inter-
relate." While the case presents what was undoubtedly a close ques-
tion, the strength of the dissent's arguments becomes apparent if one
omits from consideration the many post-enactment, nonstatutory
statements regarding tobacco regulation, and instead gives paramount
weight to the 1938 Act itself coupled with greater deference to the
FDA's conclusions about the significance of 1990s revelations. Atten-
tion to historical context makes sense, but recourse to self-referential
statements of legislative participants about what they think a law or
For a comparison of the one-Congress fiction and dynamic statutory interpreta-
tion approaches, see infra Part III.B.4. The dissent looked at the abundant post-1938
history as being consistent Aith a different conclusion, namely that such activity re-
flected care not to disturb the 1938 legal authority, with only one express congres-
sional enactment specifically referring to the 1938 FDCA authority. That statute, The
FDA Modernization Act of 1997, explicitly disclaimed any efforts to constrain or deny
FDA tobacco authority. See 21 U.S.C. § 321 note (Supp. III 1997) (Regulation of To-
bacco) (stating that "[n]othing in this Act... shall be construed to affect the question
of whether the [FDA] has any authority to regulate any tobacco product"), quoted in
Brown & Williamson, 120 S. Ct. at 1316, 1327 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
- The majority spent pages analyzing post-1938 regulatory statements, statutes,
and bills, but devoted only one paragraph to the 1938 law's enactment context. See
Brown & illiamson, 120 S. Ct. at 1308. The dissent, in contrast, looked in greater de-
tail at the 1938 Act's "vertical history." Id. at 1317-19 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (examin-
ing the Act's pre-enactment history, the Court's construction of that law, and general
understandings prevalent in legislation from around 1938 that granted broad authority
to administrative agencies).
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regulation should mean remains a problematic source for interpretive
guidance.'O
4. Other Supreme Court Examples
Bennett, Casey, and Brown & Williamson are far from the sole ex-
amples of judicial use of the one-Congress fiction. For example, in
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, Justice O'Connor wrote
the majority opinion in a case that divided the Court five to four."' As
in Brown & Williamson, she gave significant weight to a referent statute
that post-dated the primary statute at issue. Gebser concerned the pre-
requisites for an implied private cause of action for damages under
Title IX, a 1972 civil rights statute that links the receipt of federal dol-
lars to a prohibition on sex discrimination. To justify its conclusion
that such a private action could not be brought absent deliberate in-
difference of the defendant school district to a teacher's sexual har-
assment of a student and actual notice of such harassment, the Court
compared Title IX with provisions of Title VII enacted in 1991.102 Ti-
tle VII's 1991 amendment provides a private cause of action for dam-
ages, but limits the amount of damages allowable.' 3 Title IX, in con-
trast, contains no explicit private cause of action. However, in Cannon
V. University of Chicago10 4 and Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,'0 5
decided in 1979 and 1992 respectively, the Court had first implied a
Title IX private cause of action although the statute contained only
textual reference to administrative enforcement and then, in the later
case, concluded that the implied private cause of action includes a
right to damages.' Gebser, in the words ofJustice O'Connor, set out
100 Justice Breyer's dissent offers a strong rebuttal of the majority's view that the
FDA could not assert jurisdiction over tobacco because the FDCA would appear to
mandate FDA banning of cigarettes. The majority states that such a conclusion is un-
tenable. Id. at 1301-06, 1314. Justice Breyer countered that the FDA should be found
to have discretion in the exercise of its remedial power, but also suggested that if the
majority's statutory reading were correct, then the FDA erred not in asserting jurisdic-
tion, but in failing to ban cigarettes. Id. at 1322-23 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
101 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
102 Id. at 283-87.
103 See id. at 283 ("Tide VII contains an express cause of action .... and specifically
provides for relief in the form of monetary damages.... Congress therefore has di-
rectly addressed the subject of damages relief under Title VII and has set out the par-
ticular situations in which damages are available as well as the maximum amounts re-
coverable.").
104 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
105 03 U.S. 60 (1992).
106 See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 281-84 (describing the Cannon and Franklin holdings).
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to articulate "the contours of that liability."'"
The interstatutory cross-referencing in Gebser arises in two portions
of the majority's opinion, one of which appears to be critical to its
conclusion. The substantially later-enacted Title VII private cause of
action explicitly includes "any agent" under its definition of "employ-
ers" who may be liable for discriminatory acts.' 8 The Court noted that
"Title IX contains no comparable reference to an educational institu-
tion's 'agents,' and so does not expressly call for application of agency
principles."'O This seemingly minor comparative observation later
became central to the Court's conclusion that school districts should
not be liable for their teachers' actions absent actual notice of such a
problem to officials with authority to take corrective action. Had the
Court not read the absence of the term "agent" as indicating that an
agent's (here teacher's) acts should not be imputed to their principal
(the school system), the case might have reached a different conclu-
sion. The Court similarly explained its unwillingness to allow unlim-
ited damages recoveries for Title IX plaintiffs by comparing Title Vii's
limited damages remedy with the language of Title IX:
Adopting petitioner's position would amount, then, to allowing unlim-
ited recovery of damages under Title IX where Congress has not spoken
on the subject of either the right or the remedy, and in the face of evi-
dence that when Congress expressly considered both in Title VII it re-
stricted the amount of damages available.10
In dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the interstatutory comparisons
and instead argued that the focus should be on Title IX's own history,
particularly what he argued should have been the dispositive effect of
the two previous Supreme Court cases construing Title IX impliedly to
authorize a private damages action."' Justice Stevens also took issue
with the majority regarding the relevance of Title VII's inclusion of
"agents" within its definition of "employer." Rather than drawing an
1,-7 Id. at 281. Much of both the majority and dissenting opinions focus on how
best to construe this implied cause of action, with particular disagreement regarding
whether it was sound reasoning for the majority to give substantial weight to notice re-
quirements of Title IX's administrative enforcement scheme to justify its conclusion
that private damages suits could only be brought where an "official who ... has author-
ity to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures... has
actual knowledge of [the] discrimination." Id. at 290.
', Id. at 283.
Il d.
", Id. at 286.
See id. at 294-96 (StevensJ., dissenting) ("We should.., seek guidance from the
text of the statute and settled legal principles rather than from our views about sound
policy.").
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inference from the cross-statutory comparison of this isolated lan-
guage, he considered Title IX's "focus on the protected class" as ex-
plaining the lack of the term "agent."" He further examined the ver-
tical history of the Title VII referent "agent" and observed that the
Court itself in 1986 construed that language not as an expansion of
liability for employers, but as "'evinc[ing] an intent to place some lim-
its on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to
be held responsible.'""5 Stevens further rejected the majority's "crea-
tive argument" about inferences to be drawn from the comparison of
the damages remedies of Titles VII and IX, stating that such an inter-
statutory difference "does not have any bearing on when damages may
be recovered from a defendant in a Title IX case.""
4
In Amoco Production Co. v. Southern Ute Indian Trbe,"5 Justice Ken-
nedy relied heavily on the one-Congress fiction in explaining his con-
struction of 1909 and 1910 laws to conclude that "surface patentees,"
not the Southern Ute Indian Tribe who owned coal rights, owned
coalbed methane gas. The 1909 and 1910 Coal Land Acts left unad-
dressed who had rights to such coalbed gas. As might be expected,
part ofJustice Kennedy's opinion focused on what was understood re-
garding coal mining and gas recovery at the time these laws were
passed.1 6 He concluded that Congress "chose not to reserve oil, natu-
ral gas, or any other known or potential energy resources." 7 His use
of the one-Congress fiction appears in the next paragraph where he
further justified his statutory construction with reference to several
subsequent statutory enactments, ultimately concluding that "[w]hen
Congress wanted to reserve gas rights.., it did so in explicit terms."""
No other Justice questioned the appropriateness of this interstatutory
comparison.
The one-Congress fiction interpretive technique thus not only ap-
pears with frequency in the Court's opinions, but also has at times
been critically important to the result reached. The Court has seldom
offered more than a cursory defense of this approach to statutory in-
11 Id. at 299 n.9 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
113 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 72 (1986)).
114 Id. at 302 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
1 526 U.S. 865 (1999).
16 See id. at 868-71 (discussing the passage of, and motivation behind, several acts
related to the allocation of coal-rich tracts of land).
117 Id. at 877.
118 Id.
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terpretation.1 , The following Parts offer a critique of this interpretive
practice and use this critique to explore larger questions about the
underpinnings and limitations of textualist modes of interpretation.
119 In additional Supreme Court cases from recent years, the majority opinion or
separately drafted concurrences or dissents reveal interstatutory referencing of the sort
referred to in this Article as the one-Congress fiction. See, e.g., Meghris v. KFG West-
ern, 516 U.S. 479, 485 (1996) (O'ConnorJ.) (denying recovery of cleanup costs under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") because of explicit provision of
such recovery in the later enacted Comprehensive Environmental Response Compen-
sation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA") that "demonstrated" Congress "knew
how to provide for [such] recovery"); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a
Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 717-20 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the
majority's construction of the term "harm" under the ESA and citing other statutes'
use of the term to justify a contrary result); City of Chicago v. Envt. Def. Fund, 511
U.S. 328, 337-38 (1994) (Scalia, J.) (confirming an interpretation of a provision in
RCRA with reference to a provision in the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 and stating that "[w]e agree with respondents that this
provision 'shows that Congress knew how to draft a waste stream exemption in RCRA
when it wanted to'" (quoting Brief for Respondents at 18)); Pierce v. Underwood, 487
U.S. 552, 564-67 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (construing Equal Access to Justice Act's phrase
"substantially justified" in light of the APA's use of the term "substantial," dictionary
usage, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but also briefly alluding to the legisla-
tive history and case exegesis of similar terms to buttress its conclusion); United States
v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439,444-50 (1988) (Scalia,J.) (interpreting the Civil Service Reform
Act's judicial review provision in light of several other laws, but also looking beyond
mere text to legislative history and other evidence of the historical context of referent
provisions); Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 479 U.S. 511, 517 (1987)
(O'ConnorJ.) (interpreting language in the Federal Unemployment Tax Act by turn-
ing to prior Court interpretations of similar language in veterans statutes); Metro. Life
Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1987) (O'Connor, J.) (employing the Labor
Management Relations Act ("LMRA") to aid in interpretation of language in the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") but drawing interpretive
inferences in part due to legislative history suggesting that ERISA be construed like
LMRA); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-51 (1987) (O'Connor, J.) (using
case law concerning the McCarran-Ferguson Act to interpret ERISA); W. Air Lines,
Inc. v. Bd. of Equalization, 480 U.S. 123, 130-31 & n.* (1987) (O'Connor, J.) (using
the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 and Motor Carrier Act
of 1980 to shed light on the language of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act);
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 & n.16 (1985) (Powell, J.)
(interpreting the Age Discrimination in Employment Act by turning to Title VII due to
"similarity between the two statutes"). But see Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Dep't of
the Interior, 526 U.S. 86, 93 (1999) (Breyer, J.) (stating that "linguistic differences" in
two labor laws "tell us little" and declining to find interpretive significance in such dif-
ferences); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 25 (1983) (Blackmun, J.) (refusing to
assess language in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act based on
language in the Controlled Substances Act because "[1]anguage in one statute usually
sheds little light upon the meaning of different language in another statute, even when
the two are enacted at or about the same time"). For a few examples of interstatutory
cross-referencing that show greater attention to historical context and the Court's own
handiwork, see infra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
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II. A SINGLE CONGRESS AND MULTIPLE STATUTORY MEANINGS
The provisions of Article I ensure that all legislation, prior to en-
actment, will go before and be voted on by legislators in the House of
Representatives and in the Senate, and then be presented to the
President. Despite this continuity in legislative process, the regular
congressional and presidential elections and changing committee
membership ensure ever-changing political dynamics. 20 Further-
more, administrative agencies' changing personnel and leadership,
and ever-evolving bodies of regulation, frequently modify the legal
terrain and incentives for legislators to legislate on particular issues.
As a matter of empirical fact, different individuals make up the Con-
gress and the executive branch at different times, and no legislation is
produced with identical supporting voters. Even without embracing
public choice arguments about legislative incoherence in the context
of group voting, one can comfortably state that no theory of statutory
interpretation can sensibly be based on the claim of an identical con-
gressional drafter and coalition behind two different statutes.
Nevertheless, opinions utilizing the one-Congress fiction interpre-
tive technique frequently make primary-referent statutory compari-
sons using language that assumes some ideal unity of understanding,
usage, and meaning about past laws, law in the legislative process
when the primary statute was enacted, and sometimes even laws en-
acted after the primary statute.121 In opinions employing the one-
120 See Shepsle, supra note 62, at 241, 244 (observing that even if legislative majori-
ties and the President did not change, changing committee chair identities would
change likely outcomes, and that legislative intent is impossible to locate because of
similar "idiosyncratic, structural, procedural, and strategic factors"); see also Jerry L.
Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Undestanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 123, 134 (1989) ("Statutes are ... the vector sum of political forces expressed
through some institutional matrix which has had profound, but probably unpredict-
able and untraceable, effects on the policies actually expressed." (emphasis omitted)),
quoted in Shepsle, supra note 62, at 242.
1 Professor Popkin has noted that an assumption of an ideal, unitary drafter is
often evident in the jurisprudence ofJustice Scalia. See Popkin, supra note 6, at 1143-
45, 1148-52 (making this point through a discussion of the standards of writing style
and grammar to which Justice Scalia holds Congress, and his general assumptions
about the coherence of the body of federal statutes); see also WILLIAM D. POPKIN,
STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 239-
46 (1999) (exploring judicial approaches to arguments grounded in comparisons of
multiple statutes). As shown in this Article, Justice Scalia is far from alone in his em-
brace of the one-Congress fiction. See generally supra Part I (discussing the use of the
fiction by other judges and academics). While other legal systems, such as that of
Great Britain, strive for unity of drafting strategies and interpretive conventions, see
P.S. ATrYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAw
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Congress fiction, the legislature is often anthropomorphized, in the
sense that it is treated as if it were a single natural person, albeit a per-
son of superhuman omniscience and consistency of style. Such an
approach cannot and does not appear to rest on some unsupportable
assertion about a static collection of political actors.
Nevertheless, the following sections assume a highly unrealistic
static political environment. As shown below, even with such a static
set of political actors, it remains difficult to justify the one-Congress
fiction technique based on some other explanation or theory of poli-
tics and law. Building primarily off of theories of politics and legisla-
tion rooted in Positive Political Theory ("PPT"),'2" this Part discusses a
few common situations in which the language of statutes is likely to
change without necessarily reflecting an intent to change statutory
meaning. '
96-114, 298-335 (1987), the one-Congress fiction interpretive ploy does not seem to be
rooted in any actual uniform shared drafting or interpretive conventions. None of the
examples discussed in Part I devote attention to drafting and interpretive conventions
prevalent at the time of the primary statute's drafting. Instead, referent laws regularly
are separated by many years from the primary statute's enactment date, and are there-
fore drafted against a different set of political assumptions, drafting practices, and even
differentjudicial precedents that shed light on interpretive practices.
11! For an in depth discussion of the implications and attributes of Positive Political
Theory, see Symposium, Positive Political Theory and Public Law, 80 GEO. L.J. 457 (1992).
Professors Farber and Frickey define PPT as "non-normative, rational-choice theories
of political institutions." Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political
Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 462 (1992). PPT scholarship and theories focus
upon how institutional settings influence political processes and outcomes. See id. at
460-63 (describing PPT in broad terms). For additional characterization of PPT, see
ESKRIDGE & FRIc1KEY_, supra note 9, at 61-66. PPT theories assume that political actors
are aware of each other, that they anticipate each others' actions and adjust to accom-
plish their own goals, that goals range from the self-interested to the ideological, and
that institutional arrangements will influence how political actors interact. See Farber
& Frickey, supra at 462 (using the term PPT as a non-normative framework that exam-
ines the goals and motivations of political actors). PPT shares many of its basic as-
sumptions with public choice theory, but public choice theory focuses more on general
political propensities such as rent seeking and vote cycling (as suggested by Kenneth
Arrow), while PPT focuses more on how political processes and institutions influence
ultimate political outcomes. See id. at 460-62 (exploring the theoretical and practical
differences between PPT and public choice theory). Public choice theorists also tend
to assume a simpler set of rational impulses of political actors, particularly, but not ex-
clusively, actors' desire for wealth or politicians' desire for re-election. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory In-
terpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 320 (1988) ("Though legislators do have strong incen-
tives to be reelected, institutional process scholars argue that legislators' behavior is
also influenced by a rich array of other factors, including their desire to contribute to
sound policy and to gain respect within the legislature.").
12 For a discussion of the changing nature of legislation due to the growth of the
administrative state and for a discussion of a "preliminary theory of modem legisla-
tion," see Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L.
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A. A Fictional Two-Statute, Permanent
Political Personnel World
This section assumes the following simplified political context.
This hypothetical world draws in its basic conception on earlier works
on statutory interpretation and the legislative process, especially those
of Professors Eskridge, Ferejohn, McCubbins, and the three-professor
entity referring to itself as "McNollgast." 124 A dispute regarding a pri-
mary statute (Si) is before the courts. S1 and an earlier-enacted ref-
erent statute, S2, both were enacted during a time when the same ex-
act personnel held office in the House of Representatives, the Senate,
and the White House. This discussion also assumes that, as in the
cases discussed above in Part I, S1 and S2 have provisions addressing
an issue of sufficient similarity in language and subject that litigants
and courts would at least be tempted to engage in the one-Congress
fiction interpretation methodology and draw inferences from cross-
referencing these provisions in S1 and S2.
Both S1 and S2 are statutes that empower administrative agencies
to implement their respective enabling acts.'25 For purposes of this
REv. 369, 371 (1989).
124 See, e.g., W"illiam N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 334 (1991) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation Decisions] ("[P]osit[ingl that a dynamic game exists between the
Court, the relevant congressional committees, Congress, and the President... [in
which] ultimate statutory policy is set through a sequential process by which each
player-including the Court-tries to impose its policy preferences."); William N. Esk-
ridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988) (examining
critically and historically the "super-strong presumption" against overruling statutory
precedents); William N. Eskridge, Jr. &John Ferejohn, TheArticle I, Section 7 Game, 80
GEO. L.J. 523, 529 (1992) ("drawing upon formal models developed by positive politi-
cal theory" to analyze Article 1, § 7 of the U.S. Constitution "as a sequential game");
John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, 6J.L. EcON. &
ORG. 1 (1990) (arguing that sequence is highly important in the context of a separa-
tion-of-powers regime); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and
Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control ofAgencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431,
432 (1989) (advancing the proposition that administrative procedures are "one means
of guiding agencies to make decisions that are consistent with the preferences of the
legislative coalition (including the President) that succeeded in passing the agency's
enabling legislation, but without requiring the members of that coalition to monitor,
or... be aware of, the nature of the agency's actions."); McNollgast, Positive Canons:
The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. LJ. 705, 706 (1992)
(setting forth a "positive theory of the legislative process").
15 The one-Congress fiction is similarly used in construing criminal law statutes,
but due to significant differences in how criminal laws empower a similar agent-a
prosecutor-and how disparate criminal law provisions must be considered in connec-
tion with similar acts, such as using a gun during a crime, the use of the one-Congress
fiction in the context of criminal law is arguably less problematic. In any event, this
Article and this Part's hypothetical setting focus on interpretation cases and legislative
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discussion, the exact content of the primary-referent provisions is un-
important, but such provisions in Supreme Court opinions tend to re-
gard subjects that are found in numerous bodies of law, such as fee- or
cost-shifting provisions, citizen suit provisions, remedies, key defini-
tions of persons covered by a law, or sometimes laws addressing a simi-
lar social or market issue such as natural resource extraction rights or
environmental pollution where administrators are instructed to con-
sider particular factors. While S1 and S2 were enacted during a pe-
riod when the same politicians held office in all three branches, I will
assume that the two laws were enacted a few years apart.
Like all laws, the earlier S2 was enacted after consideration and
debate by legislative committees and then on the floor of the legisla-
ture. Coalitions supporting and opposing S2 sought to convince poli-
ticians in the legislature and the White House through words, possible
campaign contributions, and electoral promises to support their side
in the legislative drafting process. Among the actors in this legislative
process are agency officials familiar with similar laws or perhaps ear-
lier versions of a similarly titled law. Politicians in the legislative and
executive branch also have past experience with such laws and, de-
pending on the exact statutory area of coverage, may seek either to
take an active political role to claim credit, or instead to engage in risk
avoidance and allow others to lead in the legislative process. 26 Among
the information all such actors are likely to consider in the drafting
process, at least in their institutional capacities and when assisted by
experienced counsel and lobbyists, is the track record of similar laws
in achieving their purposes, in their treatment and implementation
before agencies, and in disputes before the courts. I will assume that
such information goes into the legislative mix, although surely not all
legislators or executive branch officials will have actual awareness of
all such information. As positive political theorists have concluded
process in the context of enabling acts linked to the administrative state.
126 SeeJoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISMUST 131-33 (1980) (discussing rea-
sons legislators will avoid tough issues and delegate such decision making to adminis-
trative agencies); DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 13-77
(1974) (developing the theory that politicians act as re-election-seeking machines);
Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 124, at 534 ("There are numerous reasons for Con-
gress's willingness to delegate significant lawmaking power to agencies, includ-
ing... the congressional inclination to avoid or defer controversial policy decisions.").
As Professors Mashaw and Shepsle have noted, the ways in which these many
political variables will influence resulting language is difficult to predict. See Mashaw,
supra note 120, at 134 (discussing statutes as "the vector sum of political forces ex-
pressed through some institutional matrix which has profound, but probably unpre-
dictable and untraceable, effects on the policies actually expressed"); Shepsle, supra
note 62, at 244 (arguing that legislative outcomes are often dependent upon "idiosyn-
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in past examinations of political processes, it is fair to assume that ei-
ther personally or through proxies such as political parties, counsel,
legislative allies, knowledgeable committee members, and affected
citizens and interest groups, legislators and the President will, at a
minimum, have available for their consideration information about
the significant implications of most bills and their language choices.'28
Once S2 is enacted, it does not end its legislative voyage. To bor-
row and modify slightly a nautical metaphor used by Professor
Aleinikoff, S2, like any law, will progress in its implementation much
as would a ship after its launching.2 9 Each actor and institution in-
volved in S2's enactment and implementation will reveal and flesh out
the implications of S2's language choices, and by these implementa-
tion decisions and challenges surely stretch, shrink, and modify S2's
reach and import from what supporting coalitions hoped for in S2's
enactment battle.'* Many such implementation decisions will be
cratic, structural, procedural, and strategic factors").
128 See McNollgast, supra note 124, at 711-12, 716-18 (arguing that the "pragmatic
view" of legislative battles assumes that legislative partisans will seek to further their
preferences opportunistically but ultimately reach a statutory compromise); cf. Esk-
ridge & Ferejohn, supra note 124, at 553-54 (noting countervailing forces restraining
efforts to subvert congressional preferences through the manipulation of legislative
history). Positive political theorists' scholarship and theories focus upon how institu-
tional settings influence political process and outcomes, emphasizing how partisans
will seek to further their interests in ways influenced by their institutional setting. See
ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 9, at 61-66; Farber & Frickey, supra note 122, at 460-62.
12 SeeT. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 20,
21 (1988) (employing this metaphor to illustrate his contentions concerning statutory
interpretation). Professor Aleinikoff uses his metaphor to conclude with the argument
that courts can and should interpret laws to ensure their "current coherence in the
law." Id. at 52. This Article agrees with Aleinikoff's idea that a statute's voyage fleshes
out a law's implications, see id. at 57, but questions the proposition that courts and liti-
gants should be encouraged case by case to make all of the law coherent at any one
time. See infra Part IV.
130 SeeAleinikoff, supra note 129, at 57 ("Each of these interactions changes, or fills
out, the meaning of the statute."); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 124, at 527
(discussing how the involvement of the administrative state in the "sequential game"
making up the legislative process renders the process more dynamic and justifies a
modification of modes of interpretation to preserve the Constitution's "original
value"); McCubbins et al., supra note 124, at 43540 (exploring how new legislation of-
ten is not a viable response to a disliked agency interpretation due to the way different
"status quo policies" change coalitional politics and resulting legislative outcomes). See
generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 67
(1988) (discussing the implications of legislative inaction following the Supreme
Court's interpretations and many potential meanings of such inaction). The Court in
Brown & Williamson assumed such a post-enactment elucidation of statutory meaning,
but focused on post-enactment legislative activity and its implications for the primary
statute's meaning: "At the time a statute is enacted, it may have a range of plausible
meanings. Over time, however, subsequent acts can shape or focus those meanings."
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purely political and discretionary, but others, particularly regulatory
choices made by agencies and judicial statutory constructions of S2,
will begin to lock S2 into a more fixed form. These last two imple-
mentation steps-regulation promulgation and judicial statutory con-
struction-not only create a more durable form of S2, but are also
likely to be highly visible and known to affected constituencies, includ-
ing supporting coalitions, agencies, opponents, and elected politicians
themselves. Even without actual regulation promulgation pursuant to
a particular S2 provision, adjudicatory actions by an agency or citizen
litigation under S2 or the APA will further reveal the import and
meaning of S2's language and structure.' In the forthcoming discus-
sion of the later enactment, S1 (the primary statute), I assume that the
implementation and interpretation of S2 have provided at least a track
record regarding S2's referent language choice.
A few years after S2's enactment, S1 is proposed. Once again, as
occurred with S2, S1 goes through a process of political debate and
scrutiny. The historical context of S1, however, is, at a minimum, dif-
ferent from S2's enactment due to the presence of S2 as well as to the
history of S2's implementation. Whether one assumes what Professor
Popkin refers to as an ideal unitary drafter,13 or just some objective
version of a legislator who either on her own or through proxies and
agents has information before her regarding S2's history, Si's enact-
ment politics will adjust in light of the track record of S2. Much as
Professor McCubbins and his co-authors, and Professors Eskridge and
Ferejohn, show how a single statute's politics and coalitional dynamics
unavoidably change once an unexpected and authoritative statutory
interpretation takes place, so too players in the S1 legislative process• '33
will adjust their strategies in light of the S2 experience. To the ex-
tent that other potential referents (S3, 54 and so on) exist, informa-
120 S. Ct. 1291, 1306 (2000).
131 Many such interpretive steps will not preclude the interpreting agency from
later changing statutory interpretations or approaches, see Chevron U.S-.A, Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (stating that where Con-
gress has not "directly addressed" the particular issue at hand, an agency's interpreta-
tion of "the statute which it administers" is entitled to judicial deference), but due to
the delays, burdens, and frequent litigation faced by an agency that changes regulatory
policy, administrative agencies do not lightly deviate from a policy or a statutory inter-
pretation once it has been officially stated, see Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on
"Deossifying"the RulemakingProcess, 41 DuKE LJ. 1385, 1396-1436 (1992) (exploring rea-
sons why agency policies often ossify).
" See Popkin, supra note 6, at 1148-52 (analyzing Justice Scalia's interpretation of
multiple statutes as sharing common meaning because of similar language and struc-
ture).
13-3 See supra text accompanying notes 122-24.
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tion about those statutes' successes, failures, and interpretations may
be added to the legislative mix.
Can linguistic comparisons about language differences justify an
inference that these laws have a different meaning or reflect a differ-
ent legislative intent? The basic hypothesis developed in the succeed-
ing paragraphs is that Sl's language choices, particularly language
changes from the referent S2 language, can result from numerous po-
tential types of legislative activity, goals, and coalition politics, as well
as from drafter ignorance, and therefore linguistic differences should
not necessarily be interpreted to require a different interpretation of
statutory meaning. Judge Easterbrook asserts that it is "impossible to
reason from one statute to another" due to the complicated institu-
tional setting and collective nature of the legislature. T Judge Easter-
brook may have overstated the possibility that legislative actors will act
with knowledge of a larger statutory context, but as shown below, his
skepticism is well founded.
B. Committee Turfs, Expertise, and Language Choice
Bills emerge from the legislative work of committees and sub-
committees, each of which deals with a different substantive area of
the law. Moreover, different committees drafting new legislative pro-
posals do so against a different baseline of existing law." 5 The current
state of workplace safety and health law differs from that of environ-
mental law, which in turn differs substantially from that of agricultural
law. The United States Code is not a complete, closed system of rules.
Instead, each statute in its voyage has its implications revealed and its
bounds stretched or shrunk by agency and court interpretations, as
136well as by political and societal developments. Political activity re-
garding S1 may be linked to S2, but it is more likely that S2's particu-
lar implications and baseline environment will differ from those fac-
ing S1 coalitions due to Sl's own distinct implementation history. If
one assumes that all legislative proposals reflect numerous legislative
134 Easterbrook, supra note 72, at 547.
135 See CHRISTOPHERJ. DEERING & STEVEN S. SMITH, COMIrrEES IN CONGRESS (3d
ed. 1997) (exploring the role of committee political power); Kenneth A. Shepsle &
Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
85 (1987) (seeking to explain why committees are such powerful institutions in the
U.S. Congress).
136 See Edwards v. United States, 814 F.2d 486, 488 (7th Cir. 1987) (rejecting the
notion that legislators examine the whole body of existing law before enacting a new
statute); see also supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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players' purposive acts designed either to achieve a policy goal or, at
least, to please each actor's constituencies, then language choices will
vary depending on the larger context of relevant law.' The legal con-
text for each subject area will vary depending on the baseline of other
laws, regulations, court decisions, and political perceptions about pre-
existing laws' merits. Each committee involved in the drafting proc-
ess, as well as each administrative agency and each affected constitu-
ency, is likely to be focused upon interrelated laws regarding overlap-
ping subject matter.
The central role of legislative staff and counsel offers one of the
few reasons to believe that disparate laws may use language in consis-
tent ways.Iss Such staff surely are one of the main reasons that, despite
public choice theory predictions of legislative incoherence, laws actu-
ally often make a good deal of sense.' The President's final signature
17 The concept is that legislators are seeking to achieve a goal and do so in a pur-
poseful manner. The assumption of "purposive activity" is not coterminous with advo-
cacy of expanding statutes to achieve their primary purpose, nor is it the same as as-
suming that the end result of the legislative process will necessarily be coherent or
public-regarding. See Karkkainen, supra note 9, at 412-13 (contrasting Justice Scalia's
limited attention to statutory purpose while noting Scalia's rejection of use of purpose
to expand a statute's reach). An assumption of purposive legislative activity can be
embraced by advocates of enforcement of the particular "legislative bargain" (such as
Judge Easterbrook), by advocates who construe statutes to further their "public regard-
ing" ends (such as Professor Macey), or by advocates of expansive readings of statutes
to further their main purpose or perhaps several purposes. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra
note 72, at 533-34, 543 (stating that judges "try to determine how the Congress that
enacted the statute actually resolved or would have resolved" the statutory ambiguity,
but arguing courts should refrain from modifying the reach or "domain" of a statute);
Jonathan R Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:
An Interest Group Mode 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 223-25 (1986) (arguing that to deter
special interest legislative rent-seeking, courts should construe laws not to implement
the legislative bargain, but to further public-regarding ends). Even Kenneth Shepsle,
who posits that the legislative processes' many steps and actors result in unpredictable
legislation that is likely to be incoherent and "morally indefensible," starts with the as-
sumption that the various legislative actors will strive in a purposive manner to further
their goals. Shepsle, supra note 62, at 241-45 (developing a model assuming individual
legislators have policy preferences and seek their enactment).
1_ See Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statuto ' Interpretation Decisions, supra note
124, at 339 (stating that "staffs are essential to monitoring judicial deci-
sions[,] ... organizing congressional hearings[,] ... and drafting committee reports
and statutes").
1.49 See id. at 343 (arguing that legislators and committee staff are aware of Supreme
Court statutory decisions). But see Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf Be-
tween Courts and Congress: A Challenge for Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO. L.J. 653, 662
(1992) (reporting the results of a project on statutory revision finding that, in most
instances, committee staff were not aware of relevant court decisions unless they were
"major" in some way). Furthermore, as a few readers of drafts of this Article suggested,
the current ready availability of computer-assisted research in legal databases makes
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or veto also will reduce the incoherence predicted by vote cycling the-140
ory. A theory of statutory interpretation that relies on the existence
of diligent legislative counsel and staff, however, is highly unlikely to
be an implicit basis for the Court's main advocates of the one-
Congress fiction. For textualists like Justice Scalia, the views of legisla-
tive counsel and staff are seen as unworthy of interpretive weight due
to the unelected status of such counsel and staff, their own political
agendas, and their alleged manipulation of legislative history to fur-
ther ends unable to be achieved in actual legislation. 4'
Legislative drafters and their staff may look further afield to sub-
ject areas under other committees' jurisdiction, but such analysis
would surely be given less weight than attention to what may become a
modified body of law covering related subjects. Committee exper-
tise and research are unlikely to reach far beyond a committee's sub-
ject coverage. Drafters' efforts to harmonize new bills with pre-
existing law are much more likely to focus on laws attacking a similar
problem or regulating the same industries than they are to focus on
unrelated bodies of law that may share legal structures. Given a
choice of either using similar language in two statutes that regulate
unrelated fields or choosing particular S1 language that will address a
substantive problem, a rational drafter will surely choose to use lan-
research into statutory language an easy option for legislative partisans and staff.
140 See William T. Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective Choice: Arrow's Theorem, Article
I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies, 1986 DUKE L.J. 948 (ex-
ploring reasons Article I's process creates the possibility of rational outcomes despite
frequent contrary interpretations of Kenneth Arrow's theorem).
In the words ofJustice Scalia, 'anyone familiar" with the legislative process "is
well aware" that staff insert legislative history materials "to influence judicial construc-
tion." Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring), quoted
and discussed in William T. Mayton, Law Among the Pleonasms: The Futility and Aconstitu-
tionality of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation, 41 EMoRY L.J. 113, 151 (1992).
Scalia continues, "What a heady feeling it must be for a young staffer, to know that his
or her citation of obscure district court cases can transform them into the law of the
land, thereafter dutifully to be observed by the Supreme Court itself." 489 U.S. at 99.
Farber and Frickey characterize justice Scalia as believing that legislative staff"connive
to subvert the judicial function by planting their.., subjective desires about statutory
meaning into committee reports .... " Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative
Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423, 439 (1988).
142 For example, in 1996, the hotly debated issue of lender liability under CERCLA
was addressed through a statutory amendment coming out of banking committees
rather than the more typical environmental committees. As perhaps should have been
anticipated, the language and structure ultimately used in the 1996 amendments was
flawed and only partially dovetailed with preexisting law. See Wlliam W. Buzbee,
CERCLA's New Safe Harbors for Banks, Lenders and Fiduciaries, 26 ENVrL. L. REP. 10656,
10662 (1996) (discussing language imperfections that are likely to result when
amendments are passed as part of appropriation bills).
THE ONE-CONGRESS FICTION
guage that addresses the substantive problem.
To make the same point from another perspective, only an irra-
tional drafter would worry about linguistic consistency with unrelated
bodies of law and give lesser attention to linked bodies of law. Simi-
larly, and perhaps more importantly, no drafter could predict to
which unrelated bodies of law reviewing courts engaging in the one-
Congress fiction in statutory interpretation might look. Purposive
drafters would look primarily to linked bodies of law. 3
C. The Better Statutory Mousetrap
Even where Si's enacting coalitions actually draft S1 with S2 in
mind, different statutory language may be embraced to achieve the
same result achieved under 82. Once S2's implications have been
fleshed out through litigation and agency implementation activities,
S1 legislative actors may be pleased with S2 and consider S2 in its im-
plemented state an appropriate template for S1. This political em-
brace of S2's meaning or results as revealed through litigation and
implementation decisions does not, however, mean that S2's actual
language choices will be repeated in S1. The S1 legislative actors may
seek to embrace the implemented S2 by putting in more explicit lan-
guage or provisions intended to ensure that S1 will share the per-
ceived successes of S2.
A good example of such language modifications in the search for
a better statutory mousetrap is the history of citizen suit provisions
added to many environmental laws since 1970. The National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act ("NEPA") did not include citizen suit provisions,
but courts construing NEPA combined it with the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act to allow citizen litigation challenging illegal government
actions under NEPA."' Advocates of environmental protection and
executive action in compliance with environmental laws saw in NEPA,
as interpreted by the courts confronted with creative litigation as well
as in other early environmental laws engendering citizen litigation in
14,1 Even with a superhuman legislative drafter, the complex legislative terrain and
many legislative actors are likely to wrest linguistic control from that drafter for a wide
variety of reasons. See Mashaw, supra note 120, at 146 (observing that little can be said
with certainty about the "mix" of legislator motivations); Shepsle, supra note 62, at 245-
46 (explaining how the committee process, legislator deliberation, procedures for
amendment, and deference to the rule of seniority affect the bills ultimately enacted
into law).
1 See Public Citizen v. Kantor, 864 F. Supp. 208,211 (D.D.C. 1994) (exploring the
NEPA and APA cause of action link).
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the 1960s and early 1970s, sound models for explicit legislative grants
of citizen suit causes of action.45 Were one merely to compare NEPA
with later laws in a vacuum, without consideration of NEPA's voyage
once launched, one might conclude either that early environmental
laws such as NEPA (S2 in this discussion) were not meant to authorize
citizen litigation, or that S1 in its inclusion of a citizen suit provision
was meant to be different from NEPA. While S1 provisions, such as
citizen suit provisions, have tended to include additional require-
ments and to authorize additional forms of litigation generally not
part of litigation under NEPA and other early environmental laws,
Si's meaning is not further illuminated by assuming that the inclusion
of explicit language indicates an intent to vary statutory content,
meaning, or results. Legislators and all actors in the legislative proc-
ess should be presumed to be rational purposive beings, even if their
complex interactions and the political process render political out-
comes difficult to predict. 46 Locking in successes evident under an
earlier statute does not necessarily mean identical language will be
embraced.
147
The likelihood that S1 coalitions may perceive a need to add spe-
cific language is particularly high when an agency interpretation of a
statutory provision in S2 is viewed as desirable. In enacting S1, ra-
tional actors will take cognizance of the implications of the Chevron148
case. In Chevron, the Supreme Court articulated a two-step frame-
work for judicial review of agency interpretations of law. As many
others have explored in voluminous scholarship on Chevron, an agency
interpretation of law in the context of a statutory gap or ambiguity
should stand if it is a reasonable construction of law, especially in
cases in which the implementing agency reconciles conflicting policies
145 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcemen4
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 196-97 (noting that first explicit citizen suit provisions were
viewed as building on the "'trend of existing law'" (quoting 1 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Div., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 93D CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR
AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 214 (Comm. Print 1974)).
146 See supra note 137 and accompanying text for a discussion of how an assump-
tion of "purposive" activity is distinct from an interpretive method that seeks to expand
upon discerned statutory purposes.
147 See, e.g., United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 431-47 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (explaining why all of the surrounding historical circumstances of a stat-
ute's enactment, and not merely the "naked words" of its text, need to be consulted to
ascertain statutory meaning). For further discussion ofJustice Frankfurter's argument
that two statutes with different language nevertheless were easily construed to have the
samepurpose, see infra text accompanying notes 182-84.
Chevron U.SA., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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or acts in a complex technical context. Only if a disputed provision
answers the "precise question at issue" ° does the agency's construc-
tion have to be consistent with the Court's preferred interpretation.
S1 coalitions may modify Sl's language to seek to prompt future
agency interpretations of S1 that will resemble already existing inter-
pretations of S2. Here, too, different language choices in S1 and S2
would not reveal rejection of S2 and its agency interpretation, but
constitute an embrace of S2 and its particular implementation.""
The opposite situation is also likely. S2 may be interpreted by an
agency or court in an unexpected manner that unsettles the expecta-
tions of the coalitions that succeeded in enacting S2. S1 drafters may
share the same goals as drafters and supporters of S2, but S1 drafters,
aware of S2's uneasy statutory voyage, will choose different language
to address the problems revealed by the unexpected interpretation.
Much as coalitions battling to return S2 to its anticipated status quo
will have to overcome a new status quo created by the unexpected in-
terpretation, S1 drafters may encounter many political hurdles in
seeking to address even a known linguistic risk.'52 Furthermore, given
the willingness of judges engaged in the one-Congress fiction to con-
strue earlier laws in light of later laws' linguistic choices, the later coa-
litions drafting S1 face the potential conundrum of unsettling S2
meaning by using more particular language in S1. Justice O'Connor
created just such a conundrum in Gebser'5 when she and a majority of
the Court construed Title IX, a 1972 civil rights law, only to grant a
circumscribed cause of action for damages because Congress had
more explicitly addressed the issue twelve years later in a differently
1" For a discussion of Chevron and citations to the vast literature analyzing the case,
see ESKRIDGE & FRICKE, supra note 9, at 860-63.
] , Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
ni Such a locking-in of a particular statutory interpretation of S2 would in one
sense constitute a rejection of S2. S1 coalitions would be narrowing the range of statu-
tory indeterminacy allowed under S2 with the goal of embracing a particular read of
S2's language. See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 6 (1983) (pointing out in an article published shortly before Chev-
ron that, in any judicial review of agency action, courts must reach a conclusion about
"the boundaries of delegated authority").
152 The dynamic political "game" that will follow an unexpected law interpretation
has been explored in depth by Professors Eskridge, McCubbins, and McNollgast. For
citations to their several works exploring this complex game, see supra notes 122-24.
For a concise summary of theories of politics and legislative process addressing politi-
cal dynamics following such a law interpretation, see ESKRIDGE & FRIcKE, supra note 9,
at 61-66
See supra notes 101-14 and accompanying text (discussing the Gebser decision in
detail).
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worded civil rights law.15 4 When used to construe earlier laws in light
of the linguistic choices made in later laws, the one-Congress fiction
creates odd incentives for legislators to avoid more precisely worded
provisions."
Legislative actors will also take into account Supreme Court inter-
pretations of earlier laws and use, where necessary, different language
to ensure that the new law (SI) will pass muster in the courts. For ex-
ample, several of the citizen suit provisions cross-referenced by the
Court in Bennett contained language closely parroting the Court's lan-
guage in Sierra Club v. Morton.'5 6 The ESA's language did not contain
the same language, but a future legislature's insertion of language
into a statute to conform to a Court-articulated standing requirement
does not mean that earlier or later statutes lacking similar language
should be construed to reveal a different legislative meaning. The
Supreme Court's own standing criteria have varied over recent dec-
ades, with prudential and APA-based requirements becoming consti-
tutional.'5 7 In the context of the Bennett use of the one-Congress fic-
tion, nothing in the history of the ESA or most of the cross-referenced
statutory provisions indicates an intent to modify the contours of pru-
dential standing hurdles under the "zone of interest" test.
Finally, in the search for "a better statutory mousetrap," legislators
may pick out portions of past laws as a template for a later law but vary
the primary statute's language or coverage in other critical respects
due to different statutory structures, enforcement provisions, and
remedies. For example, in Lorillard v. Pons, the Court found inter-
statutory comparison informative, especially when combined with an
examination of case exegesis of the referent provision and legislative
history explicitly linking the two laws. 58 The Court declined, however,
to draw interpretive inferences from a different proposed statutory
comparison despite the two laws' "important similarities" and prohibi-
tions "derived in haec verba from the suggested referent. The Court
explained, "it is the remedial and procedural provisions of the two
154 See id. (discussing Gebser).
155 In this respect, the one-Congress fiction undercuts the "legislative excellence"
argument for textualism. For a fuller discussion of theories of legislative excellence,
see infra notes 228-34 and accompanying text.
15b See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text (discussing the Sierra Club deci-
sion).
157 See Sunstein, supra note 43, at 181-82 (reviewing the impact of the APA on the
Supreme Court's standing requirements).
158 434 U.S. 575, 581-84 (1978).
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laws that are crucial and there we find significant differences.""59
D. Electoral Politics and Language Choice
Modified language can also be added to S1 to embrace S2's im-
plementation, but for reasons that may be electoral. Citizens and in-
terest groups involved in S1 enactment battles may favor portions of
S2 as a template for Si and pressure legislators and the President to
go further with more specific language. To show sensitivity to con-
stituency pressures, legislators and the President may go along with
such desires without any intent to achieve different results in Si. Not
all politicians are the pure re-election machines posited by David
Mayhew, but all politicians must be sensitive to constituency desires."O
Examples of such statutory language changes attributable to con-
stituency pressure for more detailed language to achieve the same
ends obtained with less specific S2 language are difficult to identify
with certainty." No participant in the legislative process would gen-
erally benefit from identifying such motivations for particular statu-
tory language. Environmental laws' ever-increasing specificity and
length, however, are consistent with such a hypothesis. 62 Especially in
an era of divided government, where the executive branch and the
legislature are controlled by different parties, coalitions will seek
greater statutory detail. In such a context, later S statutes will often
contain additional layers of statutory language. These linguistic accre-
tions reveal the ability of drafters to achieve statutory ends with
greater specificity, but they do not necessarily reveal a different statu-
tory meaning from laws enacted earlier. Once again, even with an
identical set of elected politicians participating in the legislative proc-
ess, different language does not necessarily signify different statutory
I'm Id. at 584.
See MAsHEW, supra note 126.
For a discussion of reasons for "congressional micromanagement" through
statutory detail and the implications of such detail in the context of textualist interpre-
tive methods, see Michael Herz,Judicial Textualism Meets Congressional Micromanagement:
A Potential Collision in Clean AirAct Interpretation, 16 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 175 (1992).
N2 For three works tracing the interaction of environmental law statutes and judi-
cial review of such enactments, see Daniel A. Farber, Is the Supreme Court Irrelevant? Re-
flections on the Judicial Role in Environmental Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 547 (1997); Robert
Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty Years of Law and
Politics, LAW & CONTEMiP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 249; Richard E. Levy & Robert L.
Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in the Supreme Court's Environmental Law Deci-
sions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343 (1989).
20001
218 UN1VERSiTYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREV1EW [Vol. 149:171
meaning or legislative intent. m
E. Retain or Modfy S2 Language?
The last conundrum faced by a legislative drafter of Si in a world
where courts engage in the one-Congress fiction is the decision
whether to retain or modify language used in a pre-existing potential
S2 referent. This section's discussion assumes for the sake of argu-
ment, in an unrealistic leap, that a drafter might somehow be able to
anticipate what S2 referents would be consulted to construe S1. Slight
language modification could lead to a conclusion that such different
language reflects a different statutory meaning, as concluded in the
Bennett string citation,'6 or it could be interpreted to support a similar
legal conclusion, as Justice Scalia also concludes in his "zone of inter-
est" discussion in Bennett, with reference to the Trafficante decision.6 5
In a world of courts engaging in the one-Congress fiction, and of liti-
gators, in turn, seeking arguments based on cross-referencing of iso-
lated statutory provisions, drafters adopting any varied language in S1
could not only lead a court to discern a significant legal difference
from 82, but courts looking forward and backward in time might even
change their construction of S2 in light of different language choices
in S1. Even an all-seeing and omniscient drafter, with the ability to
foretell which statutes would be cross-referenced, would not be able to
predict how language changes in S1 might unsettle the law. As sug-
gested above, the forward- and backward-looking aspects of the inter-
163 Professor McChesney even posits, based on theoretical and anecdotal analysis,
that politicians will embrace potential statutory changes that they actually do not sup-
port, all in an effort to attract attention and monetary support from affected constitu-
encies. FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLrIcs, RENT EXTRACTION, AND
PoLTCAL EXTORTION 56-58 (1997). While McChesney focuses on what are in essence
illusory threats of legislative change, it is likely that some threatened bills would actu-
ally gain sufficient support to be enacted. Similarly, but perhaps in an opposite phe-
nomenon, legislators will often propose legislation that has virtually no chance of pas-
sage, perhaps hoping to garner political and monetary support for a doomed effort.
Some of the more extreme "regulatory reform" proposals of the 104th Congress were
likely politically dead on arrival, but they may have made political sense for politicians
engaged in the sort of rent seeking McChesney critiques. See W'lliam W. Buzbee, Regu-
latory Reform or Statutory Muddle: The "Legislative Mirage" of Single Statute Regulatory Re-
form, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 298, 313-24 (1996) (discussing regulatory reform legislative
proposals and their reception).
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
165Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165-66 (1997). The statutory language con-
strued in Trafficante however, is actually much like that just construed in Bennett to be
legally distinguishable from the ESA's citizen suit language. See supra Part I.B.1 (detail-
ing the use of multiple statute cross-referencing in the Bennett decision).
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pretive move of the one-Congress fiction make risky any attempts in
later legislation to achieve with greater particularity what is already
provided for in earlier laws, albeit in different language.e
While Brown & Williamson analyzed statutes that regulated the to-
bacco industry, the Court inferred from several new laws and later leg-
islative activity that addressed narrower issues of tobacco marketing
that Congress had revealed an intent to prohibit any FDA regulation
of tobacco." 7 As the dissent pointed out, with the exception of one
statute specifically declining to change the status quo regarding po-
tential FDA authority to regulate tobacco, the texts of these later laws
nowhere stated anything about FDA powers under the 1938 FDCA-1ee
The Court nevertheless combined textual analysis and the absence of
explicitly empowering language in the FDCA, the existence of subse-
quent tobacco laws and the FDA's earlier decisions not to regulate to-
bacco, and abundant analysis of various political actors' views regard-
ing FDA authority, to reach the conclusion that the FDA lacked
jurisdiction over tobacco.
While Brown & Williamson presented a close question under any
approach to statutory interpretation, the majority's heavy weighting of
more limited legislative forays into tobacco regulation as revealing an
implicit prohibition of FDAjurisdiction create, once again, odd incen-
tives for legislators. Legislators desiring to regulate a source of harm
in specific, more narrowly targeted laws risk disempowering agencies
that already have latent regulatory authority. In Gebser, Bennett, or
Brown & Williamson, a different approach to statutory interpretation
that emphasized attention to each statute's text and vertical history
would likely have led to different outcomes. The Court's interstatu-
tory cross-referencing in each case gave the Court a strengthened ba-
sis to reject conclusions that appeared most logical based on the pri-
mary statute's text and vertical history alone."'
1W For example, Justice O'Connor's inferences in Gebser from a later civil rights
statute's specificity were key to how the Court circumscribed the earlier law's damages
cause of action despite different conclusions that would likely have been reached in
the absence of the later S2 referent. See supra notes 101-14 and accompanying text
(discussing Gebser). The use of the one-Congress fiction in Bennett similarly manifested
inferences drawn about the breadth of an earlier statute by looking at a later statute's
slightly more specific language. See supra Part I.B.1 (providing an overview of the Su-
preme Court's comparison of similar language in multiple statutes).
:67 See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing the Brown & Williamson decision).
1" See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Breyer's dis-
senting opinion in Brown & Williamson).
169 For a discussion of "vertical" context or history versus "horizontal" approaches,
see supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
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III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE ONE-CONGRESS FICmTON?
Justices engaging in the one-Congress fiction have infrequently ar-
ticulated an explanation for this interpretive practice. Justice Scalia
has mentioned a need for the Court to make sense of the corpusjuris,
but neither he nor other justices have provided much additional ex-
planation. This Part explores this justification, plus a few others, but
then tests this practice and these justifications against instrumental
and normative arguments underlying textualist modes of interpreta-
tion. While the one-Congress fiction technique has historical antece-
dents and is not utterly illogical, its use appears inconsistent with sev-
eral of the textualists' central goals and claims. This critique of the
one-Congress fiction further reveals the weak underpinnings of sev-
eral of textualism's empirical and normative roots.
A. Justiflcations and Interpretive Precedents
If one assumes that the legislative process has the potential to
produce logical and coherent outcomes, then predictable interpretive
methods are essential to effective statutory drafting. Evaluating the
one-Congress fiction in light of the existence of other frequently util-
ized.interpretive techniques and canons is thus of critical importance.
If this interpretive technique falls within accepted approaches to statu-
tory interpretation, or constitutes an "interpretive convention" antici-
pated by players in the legislative process, then use of such a tech-
nique may be an important means to ensure the legitimacy and
rationality of the legislative process and statutory interpretation."" As
observed by Professor Raz, and more recently expounded upon by
Professor Manning, given the difficulty (or impossibility) of locating
an actual legislative "intent" from a collective body that often fails to
anticipate tough interpretive questions, positivist theories of interpre-
tation embrace the idea that legislators must be able to assume that
"statutes... will be interpreted according to accepted interpretive
conventions."17' This desire for interpretive conventions that can be
anticipated and shared by drafters and interpreters of the law is com-
170 The British legal system, for example, appears to make a more concerted effort
to develop and utilize shared drafting and interpretive conventions. See ATIYAH &
SUMMERS, supra note 121, at 96-114, 384-407.
1 John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673,
690-92 (1997) (discussing and refining observations made in Joseph Raz, Intention in
Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW 249, 258-69 (Robert P. George ed., 1996)).
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mon to textualists and positive political theorists alike.' Laws must
be "decoded" according to "interpretive conventions prevailing in the
relevant legal culture."72 Interstatutory comparisons of isolated provi-
sions, or the "one-Congress fiction," has superficial similarity to com-
monly applied interpretive conventions, but in the final analysis, it is
significantly distinguishable from, and lacks the underlying justifica-
tions for, its two most analogous interpretive precedents.
1. Making Sense of the CorpusJuris and the
In Pai Matenia Canon
As articulated by Justice Scalia in Casey 17' and in his recent essay
on interpretation, 7' one justification for making interstatutory com-
parisons in construing a debated primary statute provision is to make
sense of the overall body of statutory law. As articulated, Justice Scalia
sees this task as one for the courts, repeatedly referring in his recent
essay on interpretation to what "we" and 'judicial opinions in my
court and others" do and should do in interpreting statutes.17 A stat-
ute must, in Justice Scalia's words, be understood in a manner "most
compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision
must be integrated-a compatibility which, by a benign fiction, we as-
sume Congress always has in mind."177 Here, his explanation appears
to be that courts, or at least the Supreme Court, should take the op-
portunity in cases to ensure some coherence across the whole body of
law, regardless of whether Congress had such an intent.
In one respect, this goal of creating legal coherence makes emi-
nent sense, especially if one imagines an opposite approach that ig-
nored other statutes' language choices and their implications. Were
the Court to look at every statutory dispute anew, without even look-
172 See McNollgast, supra note 124, at 715-16 (noting that an internally inconsistent
and unpredictable set of interpretive canons will disrupt an enacting coalition's "policy
bargain"). Public choice theorists question the logic of expecting any legislative co-
herence. See supra note 122 (citing to public choice theorists and describing central
public choice tenets).
173 Manning, supra note 171, at 692.
. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (providingJustice Scalia's explana-
tion for his interstatutory references in Casey).
75 ScAuA, supra note 4.
76 See, e.g., i& at 16 (using such terminology).
17 Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., con-
curring). Justice Scalia frequently makes such reference both to interrelated provi-
sions within a statutory scheme and to other statutes' usage. See Eskridge, supra note 9,
at 661 ("Justice Scalia will consider how the word or phrase is used elsewhere in the
same statute, or how it is used in other statutes.").
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ing at other statutes or, perhaps more importantly, the Court's own
handiwork in interpreting the laws, an incoherent line of case law
could be created. However, the seemingly laudable task of establish-
ing coherence in the law poses several substantial risks, even when
evaluated against usually articulated justifications for textualist modes
of interpretation, as discussed below in Part ilI.B.
Nevertheless, the one-Congress fiction technique has one obvious
interpretive precedent. While the technique has not often been ex-
plained as rooted in any particular canon of statutory interpretation,
the concern with avoiding interpretive incoherence in the case law
and the embrace of interstatutory comparison share many attributes
with the in pari materia doctrine. This approach to statutory interpre-
tation is invoked when statutes share a common subject matter, em-
ploy similar language, or directly refer to one another. Under such
circumstances, the judiciary "will presumptively interpret the former
law consistently with the other and will rely on prior interpretations of
one to interpret the other." 78 In several of his opinions, Justice Scalia
has cross-referenced different statutes' provisions with explicit refer-
ence to the in pari materia doctrine. Consistent with the usual applica-
tion of this doctrine, however, his analysis has included not just iso-
lated statutory language, but case law surrounding the referent
provision. 79 In other cases, however, Justice Scalia has shunned such
an interstatutory comparison due to the different fields covered by the
suggested primary and referent statutes and to the lack of textual in-
dication that the two laws were intended to be read together.8 How
178 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1007, 1039 (1989); see also Marc A. Kushner, The Legality of Race-Conscious Access
Quotas Under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 9 CARDoZO L. REV. 1053, 1080-81 (1988) (dis-
cussing the in pari'materia doctrine with reference to civil rights statutes); Michael E.
Soimine, Removal, Remands, and Reforming Federal Appellate Review, 58 Mo. L. REv. 287,
299 (1993) (discussing the inpari materia doctrine with reference to Thermtron Products,
Inc. v. Hermansdofer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976)).
179 For example, writing for the majority in Pierce v. Underwood, Justice Scalia dis-
cerned the meaning of the phrase "substantially justified" found in the Equal Access to
Justice Act in part by looking to the meaning of "substantial" garnered from the case
law surrounding the APA and Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 487
U.S. 552, 564-65 (1988). In Kungys v. United States, he arrived at the meaning of the
word "material" in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 by turning to its usage
in criminal statutes. 485 U.S. 759, 769-70 (1988).
180 Justice Scalia, in Fort Stewart School v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, refused to
compare the language used in the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Stat-
ute ("FSLMRS") to that of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), arguing that
the in pari materia rule did not apply because the fields of employment covered by the
two statutes differed and the FSLMRS did not state or imply that it was to be read in
light of the NLRA. 495 U.S. 641, 647-48 (1990).
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those who make use of the one-Congress fiction or adhere to the in
pari matefia doctrine decide which provisions are appropriate for
cross-reference inferences is not clear.'" Furthermore, in Bennett and
Casey, as well as in the few additional one-Congress fiction cases dis-
cussed above, the Court sometimes utterly fails even to examine other
data about the statutory referent, failing particularly to consider case
or agency interpretations of the referent provision.
Much as Justices Stevens and Scalia are today divided on applica-
tion of the one-Congress fiction, the Court has, in the past, divided on
the appropriateness of the application of the in pari materia doctrine.
For example, Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Monia gave a force-
ful dissent regarding the in pari materia canon."' He rejected the wis-
dom of the majority's interstatutory comparison of language, stating:
"The meaning of such a statute cannot be gained by confining inquiry
within its four comers. Only the historic process of which such legis-
lation is an incomplete fragment-that to which it gave rise as well as
that which gave rise to it-can yield its true meaning.' 8 3 He then
went on to compare the Sherman Act with the other statutes used by
the majority, and concluded that although the language differed, the-184
purpose behind the statutes was the same.
M As explored further below, Justice Scalia clearly is willing to employ the in pari
materia rule for interstatutory comparisons, but he may forego doing so if he believes
the statutes in question are too dissimilar or do not implicate each other in some
manner. 'hat makes two statutes dissimilar is contestable, though, andJustice Scalia's
reasoning for precluding the use of in pari materia in Fort Stewart School-divergent
fields of operation and no evidence that one of the statutes was meant to be read in
conjunction with the other-seems equally applicable to Pierce, Kungs, Casey, and
Bennett. For a more detailed discussion of these cases, see supra Parts I.B.I., I.B.2., and
I.B.4.
1.2 317 U.S. 424, 431-47 (1943). The majority had ruled that a party who testifies
under oath concerning a particular offense obtains immunity under the Sherman Act
irrespective of whether that party asserted his or her privilege against self-
incrimination. Id. at 425-31. The Court reached this conclusion by comparing the
Sherman Act, which said nothing about an assertion against self-incrimination, with
various other statutes that required such an assertion before immunity could be
granted. Id. at 429-30. Justice Frankfurter rejected this methodology, asserting that
"[t]he notion that because the words of a statute are plain, its meaning is also plain, is
merely pernicious oversimplification." Id. at 431.
,10 Id. at 432.
lk4 See id. at 444. Frankfurter wrote:
[T]here is a total absence of any indication anywhere that any Congressman
had any notion that the enforcement of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, the
Industrial Alcohol Act, or the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, called for a
different treatment of witnesses in proceedings . . . under the other fourteen
Acts.
Id. He criticized the majority approach for its implicit assumption that all of the stat-
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Justice Stevens also has objected to an overly broad use of in pai
materia in a case illustrating the sometimes blurred line between inter-
statutory comparisons and examinations of provisions within the same
act under the expressio unius canon. 18 5 In Sorenson v. Secretary of the
Treasury, the issue was whether a refund obtained through the earned
income tax credit could be seized by a state seeking recoupment for
past-due child support payments assigned to the state. 8 6 The Court's
examination of two provisions codified in the same act, but enacted at
different times, informed the Court's conclusion about the disputed
provision's meaning.187 The Court invoked the rule that "'identical
words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the
same meaning.'' 88 Justice Stevens, in his dissent, rejected this com-
parison of provisions enacted by different Congresses based on his
view that, in the absence of actual knowledge of these provisions'
proximity and overlap, interpretive inferences were inappropriate. 9
utes were written by a "single draftsman." Id. In his view, such an assumption was
completely unrealistic:
If a single draftsman had drafted each of these provisions in all seventeen
statutes, there might be some reason for believing that the difference in lan-
guage reflected a difference in meaning. But it is common knowledge that
these measures are frequently drawn, at least in the first instance, by specialists
(perhaps connected with interested government departments) in the various
fields. Provisions in different measures dealing with the same procedural
problem not unnaturally, therefore, lack uniformity of phrasing.
Id.
18 For greater discussion of the similarities and differences between the one-
Congress fiction and the expressio unius canon, see infra Part III.A.2.
186 475 U.S. 851 (1986).
187 The Court's determination turned on whether the earned-income tax credit
constituted an "overpayment" for the purposes of the federal intercept law, which al-
lowed states to seize federal tax refunds under certain circumstances. The federal in-
tercept statute, which referred to "overpayments," was enacted as part of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 ("OBRA"). "Congress had previously expressly de-
fined an excess earned-income credit as an 'overpayment' in § 6401 (b) of the Internal
Revenue Code-the section immediately preceding the section to which Congress
added the intercept provision." Id. at 864. Hence, though the two sections were adja-
cent to one another, they had been enacted at different times. This case clearly dem-
onstrates the frequently blurred line between contexts in which the more defensible
expressio unius doctrine is applied to construe different provisions in the same act, and
contexts where the courts are dealing with two different laws. See infra Part III.A.2
(comparing and contrasting the one-Congress fiction and the expressio unius canon); see
also Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 120 S. Ct. 1858, 1870 &
n.17 (2000) (construing whistleblower statutes as "sister schemes"); id. at 1877 (Stev-
ens, J., dissenting) (viewing the two laws as "separate" and asserting they should not
have bearing on each other).
188 Sorenson, 475 U.S. at 860 (quoting Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293
U.S. 84, 87 (1934)).
189 Id. at 867.
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In his view, it was ridiculous "to assume that a substantial number of
legislators were sufficiently familiar with OBRA to realize that some-
where in that vast piece of hurriedly enacted legislation there was a
provision that changed the 6-year-old Earned Income Credit Pro-
gramn.V
Analysis of cases applying the in pai materia doctrine indicates that
the goal is to ensure that courts engage in consistent modes of inter-
pretation. It assumes something akin to a court, Congress, and agency
conversation, where each is aware of the interpretations and acts of
the other: " [Where... Congress adopts a new law incorporating sec-
tions of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had
knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least
insofar as it affects the new statute."' 9' Where a Court makes inter-
statutory comparisons of text alone, however, without regard to case
exegesis, agency interpretations, legislative development, or history of
the referents, its practice appears inconsistent with the usual applica-
tion of the in pai materia doctrine. The in pari materia rule hence
shares several key attributes with the one-Congress fiction technique,
but it generally involves a more probing analysis of compared provi-
sions' contexts and, in particular, their past judicial interpretations.
The in pari materia approach thus is at least a logical doctrine (even if
aspirational) that at its core constrains courts and forewarns legislators
that, where authoritative interpretations by the courts of earlier laws
exist, the courts are expected to engage in consistent interpretive ap-
proaches to later laws. Interpretation by means of the one-Congress
fiction, in contrast, seldom includes attention to courts' earlier statu-
tory interpretations, focusing instead on statute-to-statute compari-
sons.
2. The One-Congress Fiction and the Expressio Unius
Canon Compared
Both justices and scholars occasionally speak of intrastatutory and
interstatutory linguistic comparisons in the same context, but the two
1") Id. He noted that although "the Court's reading of the statutory language is
faithful to its grammar," it probably did not reflect congressional intent. Id. ThusJus-
tice Stevens refused to apply the in pani materia rule in a manner that he felt violated
congressional intentions and that took a naive view towards the interconnection
among various provisions.
191 LorilIard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978), cited and discussed in Eskridge, supra
note 178, at 1039 & n.125 (explaining interstatutory comparisons but without explicit
use of term in pari materia).
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practices are quite different in implication and in their reception by
the Supreme Court.192 The justification for drawing inferences from
linguistic similarities and differences within the same statute was ar-
ticulated well byJustice Scalia in 1988:
Statutory construction, however, is a holistic endeavor. A provision that
may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of
the statutory scheme-because the same terminology is used elsewhere
in a context that makes its meaning clear ... or because only one of the
permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible
with the rest of the law.
Such an assumption of internal consistency and inference-drawing
from comparisons of language within the same statute is well estab-
lished under the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon. This canon
of construction assumes that "inclusion of one thing indicates exclu-
sion of the other.",9 4 Like the one-Congress fiction, this canon makes
greatest sense if the starting premise is something close to an omnis-
cient legislative drafter. Given the reality of a Congress that often is
sloppy, however, critics question whether significant interpretive in-
ferences should be drawn from the presence or absence of provisions
within the same law.9 " Nevertheless, this interpretive practice has
192 See Schacter, supra note 8, at 31 (discussing these two practices in her examina-
tion of the Court's "common law originalism," but questioning whether interstatutory
comparisons are justifiable); see also SCAIA, supra note 4, at 16-17 (calling for courts to
interpret laws to make them "not only internally consistent, but also compatible with
previously enacted laws"). Professor Amar's recent discussion of constitutional "in-
tratextualism," particularly his critique of "holistic textualism," shares attributes with
this Article's critique of the one-Congress fiction. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism,
112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 798 (1999) (explaining the difficulty of examining "an almost
infinite number of interclausal comparisons").
193 United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Ass'n, 484 U.S. 365,
371 (1988) (citations omitted). Abiding by this principle, Justice Scalia compared the
language and structure of various provisions in the Bankruptcy Code to discern the
meaning of"interest in property" in § 362(d) (1) of the Code. See id. at 371-79 (setting
forth the Court's analysis); see also Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason:
Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REv. 533, 545 (1988) (pointing out
that even when analyzing a statute merely with reference to statutory language, judges
still have substantial discretion in deciding "how big a chunk of text should be inter-
preted under the plain meaning rule").
194 ESKIDGE & FRIcKEY, supra note 9, at 638.
195 See id. at 639 (citing criticisms by courts and by Judge Posner of strong reliance
on this canon). Popkin asserts that divergent language may simply reflect the con-
straints placed on the hectic life of legislators, who constantly must shift their attention
based on newly-perceived problems. See Popkin, supra note 6, at 1149 ("Even within a
single statute, the idea that express references exclude what is not specifically stated is
foreign to the political reality of a busy legislature attending to problems called to its
attention.").
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been embraced by numerous Supreme Court justices, although the
justices have unsurprisingly drawn different inferences from particular
intrastatutory linguistic comparisons.19
Such an approach is also consistent with what Professor Schacter
refers to as a "disciplinarian" approach to statutory interpretation.'97
Her theory, amply demonstrated with references to both cases and
theories of legislative process, is that, due to the perceptions of some
judges that the legislative process is prone to public choice dysfunc-
tion or simple sloppiness, courts will interpret laws with an assumption
of rigor and thoroughness. Like a parent assuming that high expecta-
tions for children will encourage high achievement, disciplinary
judges assume that legislators confronted by courts expecting excel-
lence will improve their work. Such a disciplined legislature will, un-
der this theory and normative argument, rigorously ensure that simi-
lar provisions in the same statute dovetail so that interpretive
inferences can appropriately be made by courts. Legislators will be
forced to "embrace, not evade, their obligation to make hard policy
choices. "'q' This optimistic premise about the power of courts to dis-
cipline the legislature assumes that legislative rationality is a possibil-
ity.
l K4
The expressio unius canon is hence rooted in a logical, perhaps as-
pirational, premise finding support in a wide range of schools of statu-
tory interpretation. When one legislature enacts a single law, or even
when two different Congresses work on the same law, drafters are rea-
sonably expected to look at how a single law works as a whole. In this
setting, legislative partisans can anticipate what statutory provisions
will be read together. One need not embrace public choice premises
or a disciplinary approach to statutory interpretation to justify looking
v-, For a cross section of cases in which justices have either explicitly embraced the
application of the expressio unius canon or engaged in such an interpretive technique,
see ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 9, at 639 & n.3 (citing, among other cases, Key
Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994) (Stevens,J.); United States v. Smith,
499 U.S. 160 (1991) (MarshallJ.); Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989)
(Scalia, J.); Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 46-47 & n.22
(1989) (Brennan, J.); Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency and Serv., 486 U.S. 825,
836-37 (1988) (White,J.)).
v7 See Schacter, supra note 35, at 63646 (finding a prevalentjudicial view that "the
courts must discipline the political process through deliberately crafted interpretive
rules").
I- Id. at 645.
1- For a strong contrary argument that embraces public choice suppositions about
irrational legislative outcomes and criticizes as unsound judicial attempts to improve
the legislative process, see Shepsle, supra note 62.
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at a single act's similar provisions and drawing conclusions from their
language choices. Hart and Sacks suggested in their foundational Le-
gal Process text that statutory interpreters should assume that legisla-
tors, in drafting laws, engage in purposive activities and therefore in-
terpret laws in that light.2 00 To hold drafters to a presumption of
internal statutory coherence is reasonable from a wide range of ap-
proaches to statutory interpretation, from that of Justice Scalia to the
far more purpose-oriented approach espoused by Hart and Sacks.
The one-Congress fiction approach, however, is analytically dis-
tinct from application of the expressio unius canon. In the context of
interstatutory cross-referencing, the two compared laws are never the
work product of the same legislative coalitions, nor are they drawn
from two or more different legislative amendments of the same stat-
ute.20 ' While expressio unius undoubtedly rests on an assumption of
thoroughness that is often not borne out in reality, there is at least an
actual enacting coalition that knows the provisions that will share
space in the same statute. Such an enacting or amending coalition
can also reasonably be assumed to share the same expectations about
"interpretive conventions" due to the shared timing of legislative activ-
ity.2  Even where there are multiple statutory amendments, at least
the final amending coalition has an opportunity to ensure that the
laws' structures and language choices work together.2 3 The expressio
unius canon of interpretation is thus aspirational, but it does not rest
on counterfactual assumptions of omniscient legislators able to know
both the universe of similar provisions in other statutes and which
provisions and linguistic differences would be viewed as significant by
a reviewing court.2Y4 No opportunity for coherent dovetailing of pri-
200 HENRYM. HARTJR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKTNG AND APPLICATION OF LAw 1374 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P.
Frickey eds., 1994); see supra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing assumption
of "purposive" activities and distinguishing such an assumption from interpretive
methods seeking merely to further gleaned statutory purposes).
201 Interest groups acting together in coalitions regarding a statutory proposal
"propel the game forward." William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Judicial Review Game, 88 NW.
U. L. REV. 382, 385 (1993).
202 For a discussion of how a shared expectation about interpretive conventions is
central to positivist theories of statutory interpretations, see Manning, supra note 171;
Raz, supra note 171.
203 See supra note 187 (discussing disagreement on the Court in Vermont Agency re-
garding whether two whistleblower laws should be viewed as "sister schemes" and con-
strued in light of each other).
204 In contrast to the application of the expressio unius canon, the one-Congress fic-
tion approach poses another risk identified by Professor Popkin. What he calls the
"super-text" approach may intrude upon the expectation interests of legislators. Pop-
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mary-referent provisions ever exists where courts draw interpretive
significance from two different statutes' language choices. Thus, de-
spite the superficial similarity of these two practices, they are actually
significantly different. The expressio unius canon can logically be ques-
tioned, but it is far more justifiable than the one-Congress fiction.
3. The Search for Objective Meaning
A third justification for the one-Congress fiction is textualists'
search for rules of interpretation that rest on objective, common
sources for discerning statutory meaning. Under this view, interstatu-
tory comparisons are similar to several justices' preference for examin-
ing dictionary definitions rather than historical context or materials
reflecting at least some legislators' statements about actual linguistic
intent.'5 If the Court is going to interpret laws according to their
"plain meaning," using dictionaries and statutes to help discern that
meaning, then interstatutory references are sensible. 06  Professor
Schauer suggests that the use of common sources of meaning func-
tions as a "second-best coordinating device for multiple decisionmak-
ers attempting to reach some methodological consensus. "2 7 Reliance
on dictionaries rather than the legislative or political history of a stat-
ute has been strongly criticized." ' Furthermore, as suggested by Judge
Posner, the veneer of plain meaning neutrality and its apparent "me-
chanical" application "conceal... the extent to which the judge is
kin, supra note 6, at 1149. Because different provisions in the United States Code are
inserted at different times, Congress "may or may not have meant the surrounding text
to be part of an integrated document." Id. at 1150. This Article agrees with Popkin's
critique, but goes further in questioning both the soundness of the practice's underly-
ing assumptions and, as a normative matter, the wisdom of expecting courts to engage
in the one-Congress fiction.
L"' Compare MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 225-29 (1994) (Scalia,
J.) (scrutinizing extensively the dictionary usages of "modify"), with id. at 240-45 (Stev-
ens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the reliance on dictionaries as "no substitute for close
analysis of what words mean as used in a particular statutory context"). For academic
critiques of the Court's recent substantial reliance on dictionaries, see, for example, A.
Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71 (1994); Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Inter-
pretation, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1437 (1994).
See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 9, at 408 (discussing the ways in which Justice
Scalia, while arguing the primacy of text, refers to "external contexts" to derive statu-
tor, meaning).
,,7 Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain
Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REv. 231, 232.
2"- For examples of such critiques, see supra note 205. See also Pierce, supra note 9,
at 762-63 (criticizing the disruptive results of textualists' exclusive reliance on "plain
meaning" and dictionaries, without considering legislative or implementation history).
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making new law in the guise of interpreting a statute."00 Once one
assumes genuine textual ambiguity, then a plain meaning approach is
insufficient. The question then becomes how litigants and courts will
resolve the statutory conundrum.2 ' ° As shown further below, despite
its textualist pedigree, the one-Congress fiction suffers from many of
the infirmities textualists emphasize regarding more context-based
modes of interpretation. The following sections delve further into ar-
guments for and against the one-Congress fiction interpretive practice
and offer additional analysis of textualism's underpinnings and ra-
tionales in light of this critique of the one-Congress fiction.
B. The One-Congress Fiction Practice and Textualism'sJustiflcations
The one-Congress fiction is undoubtedly an interpretive practice
that is rooted in textualism. Statutory texts are compared to other
statutory texts, with courts drawing inferences from such comparisons.
While justices embracing this practice have on a few occasions looked
at more than mere text-to-text parallels, sometimes examining linked
cases and legislative history, the analysis is more often of text alone.'
It also happens that the justices most frequently utilizing this interpre-
tive ploy are self-avowed textualists. Justice Scalia, in particular, has
been vocal in articulating his empirical and normative justifications
212for textualist interpretive approaches. The now extensive debates
209 Richard Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and Courtroom, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 800, 816-17, 822 (1983) (quoted and discussed in Karkkainen, supra note
9, at 452-54); see also Farber, supra note 193, at 548 ("If the issue, however, is not the
dictionary meaning of a particular clause, but the interpretation that produces the best
'fit' with a complex statute, the judge's decision involves sufficient intangibles to leave
the door open to such 'subjective' factors [as the judge's sense of fairness, justice, or
social welfare].").
210 See Funk, supra note 9, at 845-46.
21 See supra Part I (reviewing cases in which the Court used the one-Congress fic-
tion).
2 Another preeminent textualist is Judge Easterbrook, but due to the different
roots of his advocacy of textualism, he would likely find the one-Congress fiction inap-
propriate. Justice Scalia focuses on legislator and staff manipulation of the history-
creation process, as well as ends-oriented judicial decisionmaking. See SCALIA, supra
note 4, at 29-37 (discussing the recent abuses of using legislative history as an interpre-
tive tool). Judge Easterbrook, in contrast, focuses on the impossibility of locating in-
tent in a collective entity, as does Professor Shepsle. See Easterbrook, supra note 72, at
547 ("Because legislatures comprise many members, they do not have 'intents' or 'de-
signs,' hidden yet discoverable."); Shepsle, supra note 62, at 249 (contending that Ar-
row's impossibility theorem necessarily implies that legislative intent has no meaning).
Judge Easterbrook has made clear that he does not believe one can appropriately dis-
cern meaning through statute-to-statute comparisons. See Easterbrook, supra note 72,
at 547 ("It is... impossible to reason from one statute to another .... ").
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over textualist versus originalist versus purposive versus dynamic
modes of interpretation will certainly not be resolved by this Article.
This section offers a more modest endeavor. The implications of in-
terpretation relying on the one-Congress fiction are analyzed and
tested against the main articulated justifications for textualist interpre-
tation. This comparative analysis reveals that interstatutory compari-
sons, while text-based, are largely inconsistent with the justifications
for textualism. Furthermore, this analysis of the one-Congress fiction
also reveals the weak underpinnings of textualism and calls into ques-
tion some of its supporters' broader claims about textualism's mer-
its.
"
Textualist interpretive modes are often justified by way of contrast
to interpretive methods relying on the examination of legislator or
committee statements about the meaning of disputed provisions. The
first rationale is rooted in distrust of the legislative process and public
choice concerns about politics. Judges should rely only on the statu-
tory text rather than on nonlegislative statements to ensure that legis-
lators legislate through the only means sanctioned by the Constitu-
tion-through bicameral votes and presentment to the President.
214
Such a text-only approach can be rooted in the reality of the absence
of a unified "intent" of a collective body, in concerns about legislative
"self-delegation, " 2 ' and in concerns about rent-seeking, responsibility-
dodging, and manipulative uses of legislative history by legislators who
are unable or unwilling to achieve their goals in actual laws.
The second main justification is rooted in distrust of judges. If
judges can resolve tough interpretive questions with resort to non-
textual sources, particularly legislator-created legislative history, they
will, in the oft-quoted words of Judge Harold Leventhal, manipulate
that process like "looking over a crowd and picking out your
friends. "2' 6 As stated by justice Scalia in his recent essay, A Matter of In-
21 While this discussion alludes to criticisms of textualism, this section focuses
primarily on textualists' own articulated rationales.
"1 See, e.g., SCrALA, supra note 4, at 34-36 (emphasizing the importance of the for-
mal constitutional channels of legislative enactment, bicameralism, and presentment,
to prevent lawmaking power from resting in the hands of committees or several legisla-
tors); Manning, supra note 171, at 690-91 (characterizing textualism as rooted in a
prohibition against "legislative self-delegation" that occurs when legislators can modify
a statute's meaning outside of the constitutionally mandated process).
This more recently articulated explanation for textualism is found in Manning,
supra note 171.
16 For discussions on the use of legislative history quoting Judge Leventhal's
statement, see Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65
S. CAL. L. REr. 845, 846, 861-62 (1992); Wald, supra note 11, at 214-16.
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terpretation, "the practical threat is that, under the guise or even the self-
delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, common-law
judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires, extending
their lawmaking proclivities from the common law to the statutory
field."2 1 7 Textualist modes of interpretation rooted in examination of
a single statute's text and structure do, indeed, further some of these
textualist rationales, even if other competing concerns lead some
scholars and judges to reject excessive reliance on text-limited tech-
niques.21" Allowing or encouraging judges to extend that reliance on
statutory texts to inference-drawing from comparisons of two different
laws, however, poses substantial risks ofjudicial abuse and also fails to
further several of the "legislative excellence" goals of textualist analy-
sis.
1. Promoting Legislative Excellence and
Interstatutory Comparisons
Justice Scalia, Judge Easterbrook, Professor Manning, and other
advocates of textualism suggest that judges' use of legislative history
encourages inappropriate political behavior.1 9 If legislators can insert
comments in debates and committee reports, they will do so to favor
interest groups, yet such comments will appear in a context less visible
to all players in the legislative process.220 Legislators will, under this
argument, stuff the legislative history with hooks for subsequent favor-
able statutory interpretations by the courts and, concomitantly, worry
less about flagging those particular legislative goals in actual statutory
221language. If courts examine legislative history, they reward this kind
217 SCALIA, supra note 4, at 17-18. For further exploration of textualism as a means
to constrain overreaching judges, but with a focus on constitutional decisionmaking,
see MichaelJ. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison ofJustices Black
and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV. 25 (1994).
218 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 9 (arguing that textualism frees judges to pursue
their own political agendas even if it acts to constrain some abuses of using legislative
history to interpret statutes).
See supra notes 211-15 and accompanying text (highlighting internal inconsis-
tencies between textualism's tenets and the one-Congress fiction).
220 See Peter Strauss, Legislative Theoy and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin,
89 COLUM. L. REv. 427, 436 (1989) (stating that "any realistic reader understands" that
references to what a committee "intends... are ordinarily written by staff, often at the
behest of lobbyists, not by members of Congress themselves") quoted and discussed in
Mayton, supra note 140, at 114 n.5.
21 See SCALIA, supra note 4, at 34-35 (contending that because of the Court's reli-
ance on legislative history, the primary purpose of floor debates and committee reports
is to affect the courts rather than inform the Congress); Manning, supra note 171, at
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of behavior and undercut the Constitution's designated legislative
process.
Relatedly, given public-choice and game-theory insights about vote
cycling and the absence of any discernible "intent" of a collective
body, textualists argue that courts should not give interpretive signifi-
cance to a single legislator's or committee's statements on a tough in-
terpretive issue. 2 Silent acquiescence or unexplained floor votes are
equally important to the enactment of statutes, but they are given little
or no weight if it is only explanations of advocates that sway results in
statutory interpretation battles. 2 3 Even for proponents of scrutiny of
legislative history, such as the McNollgast trio, difficult questions arise
regarding which legislators' statements or views (perhaps unex-
pressed) deserve interpretive weight. Should courts give weight to a
bill's proponents (who likely would prefer a broader statutory result),
a bill's swing voters, or the President due to his control of "veto gates"
and relatively greater individual importance to the enacted statute's
passage?...
Shunning, or at least de-emphasizing, judicial reliance on legisla-
tive history is arguably consistent with these stated ends, even if it is an
incomplete justification for textualism. Does application of the one-
Congress fiction further these ends? General shunning of self-
referential legislative history in all contexts, whether a court is exam-
ining one primary statute or multiple statutory referents, continues to
serve the goal of discouraging legislator reliance on less visible state-
ments to win political battles not clearly resolved in a statute itself.
2
2
Where courts examine two laws and draw interpretive inferences,
however, they cannot explain that analysis with reference to what Pro-
fessor Manning, a defender of textualism, refers to as the legislative
supremacy underpinnings of textualist modes of interpretation: "If
statutory interpretation bore no relation to the law the legislator in-
tended to make, it would mean very little to say that ours is a system
693-94 ("Congress may well assign explanatory authority to its own agents with the im-
plicit understanding that their exposition will influence courts.").
2 See Shepsle, supra note 62, at 240-50 (developing a public choice model for the
workings of legislatures derived from Arrow's impossibility theorem and concluding
that legislative intent is a meaningless notion).
See, e.g., McNollgast, supra note 124 (exploring the significance of veto gates and
suggesting that investigating legislative history can yield important information about
"whose preferences were most consequential" to the enacting coalition).
, Id. at 720.
' See supra note 14 and accompanying text (explaining concept of "self-
referential" legislative history).
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marked, within constitutional boundaries, by legislative supremacy.
2
1
6
No realist or positivist theory of interpretation can expect actual
or even ideal legislators to have the several layers of knowledge neces-
sary if one is to root the one-Congress fiction in conceptions of legisla-
tive supremacy and a search for meaning based on shared "interpre-
tive conventions." In contrast to the analysis of a single law's meaning,
interpretive inferences from interstatutory comparison resting on
some anthropomorphized or single omniscient and consistent drafter
conception of Congress and intended meaning would require at least
one, if not both, of the enacting Congresses to have the following
highly unlikely layers of knowledge. They must: (1) know what laws
will be the subject of interstatutory comparison, (2) know what lin-
guistic consistency or inconsistency will be found significant by a re-
viewing court, and (3) share a common set of "interpretive conven-
tions," even with laws enacted at different times and often in
unrelated fields of regulation that have their own set of assumptions
and history. Possession of these layers of knowledge is particularly un-
likely because the world of legislation is not a closed system where
only legislators control statutory meaning; as discussed above in Part
II, court and agency interpretations, as well as changing political envi-
ronments, lead legislators and affected coalitions to seek statutory
change. These assumptions, necessary to make sense of the one-
Congress fiction, have utterly no basis in any positivist or realist con-
ception of the statutory process.
Furthermore, even if the goal is to encourage legislative excel-
lence in drafting and more thorough research into the implications of
language choice, the three necessary layers of knowledge suggested
above are simply beyond any individual's or collective entity's capabili-
ties. If, however, courts engage in the one-Congress fiction only
where there is indication in the text itself, in a statute's historical con-
text or perhaps even in legislative history, that some knowledge of two
or more laws' interconnection existed, then knowledge layers (1) and
(3) are at least arguably met.
228
226 Manning, supra note 171, at 691 (discussing concepts of intent in Raz, supra
note 171). For a thorough exploration of the legislative supremacy underpinnings of
statutory interpretation theories, see Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legis-
lative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989).
227 SeeJohn Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory In-
terpretation, 80 GEo. L.J. 565 (1992) (assessing the implications of the "dynamic" ten-
sions among enacting Congresses' goals, different views of later Congresses and statu-
tory implementers, and judicial review).
228 Thus, in the FDA tobacco case, the Court appropriately examined the interrela-
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A brief discussion is necessary here to elucidate further the dis-
tinction between legislative history and a statute's "historical context."
Textualists' concern with self-referential or self-conscious creation of
history for reviewing courts is arguably addressed if one instead em-
braces judicial examination of a statute's historical context without
consideration of self-referential legislator statements." For example,
in Casey, Justice Scalia could have disregarded legislator statements
about the goal of responding to the Court's Alyeska decision, yet still
considered that decision's existence and the baseline set of interpre-
tive presumptions prevailing in the lower courts before Alyeska.2 ° His-
torical analysis that ignores or skeptically examines self-referential
statements of legislators regarding meaning poses a substantially lesser
risk of encouraging legislators inclined to play the legislative history
game derided by many textualists.2I Textualists might respond, with
some basis, that a legislature responding to a particular phenomenon,
agency rule, or court opinion, could include explicit textual reference
to such a motivation, as occasionally occurs."2 Encouraging such
statutory explicitness, however, would not be rooted as much in con-
cerns about legislator misbehavior as in a goal of forcing legislative ar-
ticulation not just of a new legal standard, but of the historical under-
pinnings of a law's linguistic choices. This is not an impossible goal,
but to date it has not been a typical mode of legislating. It would also
further a goal of legislative excellence, but it would not be intended to
tionships among laws regulating tobacco products. See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing the
Brown & Williamson decision). Not only would legislators have given such potentially
overlapping laws consideration, but the Court unavoidably had to consider how these
various statutes were interrelated. The Court took a far less justifiable interpretive
step, however, when it inferred a legislative intent to give the FDA no tobacco jurisdic-
tion, based in part on later laws that contained no actual language regarding FDA
power, as well as upon legislative partisans' statements arising in many contexts other
than in codified laws.
22 As discussed in the succeeding section of this Article, concerns about potential
judicial misbehavior remain where judges can engage in the one-Congress fiction.
Vw) See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the Court's disregard for historical context in the
Casey decision).
Brown & Williamson is unusual in its substantial reliance on numerous political
actors' views about the FDA's powers over tobacco taken well after 1938, despite these
various actors' failure to place such jurisdiction-denying language in any post-1938 law.
For reasons unknown, the Court's textualists join this opinion with nary a word of
qualification or dissent disagreeing with the Court's heavy reliance on legislative his-
tory in the form of individuals' statements made well after the primary statute's enact-
ment.
V 2 See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 250-51 (1994) (noting ex-
plicit references in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to recent Court decisions interpreting
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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deter legislative manipulation of legal results through legislative his-
tory. 2  Such a goal of requiring greater legislative detail might have
the additional effect of reducing the amount of law enacted due to
the greater difficulty in garnering enacting coalitions when legislative
winners and losers are made more explicit.24
2. DeterringJudicial Manipulation and
Interstatutory References
Textualists express equally substantial concern over interpretive
methodologies allowing judges to manipulate their analysis of legisla-
tive history not to justify some objectively reasonable statutory inter-
pretation but to further their own personal views. Their argument is
that the greater the body of materials a court can draw on in inter-
preting a law, the greater the potential for judicial abuse. Confining
judges to the statutory text and its objectively reasonable meaning, the
argument goes, reduces this risk of manipulation. Were textualist
judges merely to confine themselves to a single statute's text, this justi-
fication would at least make logical sense. When courts start to refer
to materials other than the primary textual provision, however, they
too have given themselves a more open interpretive field. Only if that
field of reference materials is somehow confined is the risk ofjudicial
abuse that ostensibly motivates textualists addressed. One need not
delve deeply into recent Court decisions relying on dictionaries to see
how that purportedly "objective" source of meaning merely serves as
artillery, with the majority and dissenters engaging in battles of the
dictionary definitions, on one occasion even seeking to explain a stat-
ute from the 1970s with reference to the 1766 Blackstone Commentar-
ies, which in turn quoted the Digest ofJustinian.2s
233 Creation of yet more "clear statement" rules and expectations of legislative ex-
plicitness might deter legislative "passing of the buck," a practice criticized by public
choice scholars and advocates of less broad delegations, hut it would also be in tension
with the benefits of regulatory flexibility embraced in the Chevron decision.
234 See McCubbins et al., supra note 124 (exploring reasons legislators will use ad-
ministrative structure and processes as well as citizen enforcement to further legislative
goals, to reduce monitoring costs, and to defer or avoid thorny issues). Rendering law
enactment more difficult might reflectjudicial political preferences for less regulation,
much as "quasi-constitutional" clear statement rules have been manipulated to further
judges' ideology by way of "backdoor... constitutional activism." William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional
Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597-98 (1992).
235 See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687,
717 (1995) (Scalia,J., dissenting). For an example of the Court's battle over the use of
dictionaries, compare MC! Telecomms. Corp v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 224-28 (1994)
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Interstatutory references are similarly prone to judicial abuse.
First, as utilized in the cases described and cited above, the body of
potentially relevant comparisons of statutory provisions appears un-
limited by time or subject matter. Any statute, whether it pre- or post-
dates the primary statutory provision, can be cross-referenced. It need
not even concern the same field of regulation. Furthermore, either
due to intentionally disingenuous judicial behavior or, perhaps, mere
sloppiness, the Court's use of this interpretive technique often does
not even include grappling with the Court's own previous interpreta-
tions of the primary or referent provisions. In most instances, texts
are compared to texts, while other sources of enlightenment regard-
ing historical context are ignored even when brought to the Court's
attention. 2 6
The lack of rigorous grappling with materials other than the text
may result from the way interpretations based on the one-Congress
fiction cannot effectively be anticipated in the litigation process. If
only a single statute is debated before a court, opposing counsel will
each know the materials from which to draw. When the primary stat-
ute could be construed in light of any arguably similar law, however,
advocates will not be able to predict which referents to research. The
unpredictability this interpretive ploy creates is likely to lead advocates
faced with briefing page limits to offer analysis that may be a mile wide
but an inch deep. 7 Perhaps this inability of advocates to anticipate
which referents the Supreme Court would find relevant explains the
sloppy cross-referencing evident in Bennett, Casey, and most other re-
cent cases using this interpretive methodology.
A strong argument can be made that use of the one-Congress fic-
tion is more prone to judicial abuse than is reference to legislative his-
tory. As a resource, legislative history can typically, or at least persua-
sively, only be cited if its own text reveals a view on the disputed
statutory question. Interstatutory cross-referents, in contrast, need not
contain any indication whatsoever that would cause anyone to expect
that they would be used to assist in interpretation of another statute's
disputed provisions. They are, in a sense, a form of history that no
one could anticipate would be used in the context of debate over an-
other law. In the legislative history context, coalitions engaged in
(Scalia,J.), with id. at 240-43 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
2' See supra Part I.B (discussing cases in which the Supreme Court made use of the
one-Congress fiction without regard to historical context).
:!,7 See generaUy Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modem American Constitutionalism,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995) (discussing the pervasive superficiality of historical
analysis in constitutional scholarship and Court opinions).
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statutory enactment battles will watch for overreaching statements re-
garding legislative intent and put their own responses in the record.'"
Legislators abusing the ability to explain statutory meaning in a collec-
tive setting, such as a committee report, will also be noticed by others
and, if the abuse continues, eventually no longer trusted to participate
in such declarations of meaning." 9 The adversarial process by which
statutory disputes reach judges makes it likely that both pieces of legis-
lative history will be placed before the court.24 A judge referring to
such legislative history will, due to her sense of judicial craft and her
obligation to draft a defensible opinion, only use historical materials
that actually refer to the disputed statutory issue and be forced to
grapple with supporting and contradictory legislative history.24' Fur-
thermore, trial judges will worry about appellate reversal, while appel-
late judges must consider panel dissents or en banc or higher court
reversal. Even for the lofty Supreme Court, academic critiques are
likely to discern unjustified reliance on legislative history. Legislators
and judges are thus constrained in which materials they can use and
how they use them. Inferences from additions and omissions of par-
ticular language in different statutes, in contrast, are subject to no
such similar constraints, apart from ajudge's obligation to explain her
rationale. That explanation, however, is far less constrained when the
only materials before the court are two statutory texts. Mere similarity
of language or statutory function appears to be enough of a potential
trigger for interstatutory references and related inferences regarding
meaning.
To put the previous paragraph's point differently, one can envi-
23 See McNollgast, supra note 124, at 726 (arguing that "statements... that are not
contradicted or rejected at some later stage are implicitly approved by their parent
chambers when the bill itself is approved").
239 See id. (noting PPT's prediction that actors who engage in strategic behavior to
try to shape legislative history can be sanctioned as the ultimate authority to make leg-
islative decisions is always retained by the majorities of each house).
240 See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in
Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE LJ. 1051, 1053-62 (1995) (analyz-
ing how "craft" and "outcome" concerns influence judicial decisionmaking); Strauss,
supra note 9, at 251-52 (suggesting reasons judges are constrained from misusing his-
torical materials).
241 See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 240, at 1053 (defining judicial craft as "the well-
reasoned application of doctrine to the circumstances of a particular
case... reflect[ing] the values of consistency with constitutional and statutory provi-
sions and continuity with prior case law, but permit[ting] interstitial evolution and, in
exceptional cases, [the] overruling [of] precedent"); Zeppos, The Use of Authot, supra
note 9, at 1135 (describingjudges as risk-averse beings who seek as many bases of ana-
lytical support for their decisions as possible in order to avoid reversal).
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sion a disputed interpretive issue as calling for analysis similar to the
discernment of the direction of data points on a graph. The primary
statute's text creates data points to which any interpretation must con-
form. In the common setting of genuine uncertainty about statutory
meaning, those data points are likely to be few and often will be in-
conclusive. Legislative history data points will frequently provide dif-
ferent potential arguments about appropriate interpretations, but
when a judge who considers historical context interprets a disputed
provision, thatjudge will need to examine text, historical context, and
legislative history and then craft ajudicial response that is defensible,
taking all of these data points into account. Perhaps for this reason a
majority of the Supreme Court still believes that some consideration
of historical context and legislative history is appropriate, even if the
statutory text is paramount.42 If a judge embraces an outlier that is
inconsistent with other indications of statutory meaning, the resulting
opinion will be attacked. Mere text-to-text comparisons, in contrast,
provide virtually no constraining data points that a judge must evalu-
ate and explain in reaching a result. The universe of ostensibly simi-
lar statutory provisions-frequently a huge universe-is putty for judi-
cial molding.43
One additional risk ofjudicial abuse is posed by the one-Congress
fiction. As in Bennett, each construction of a cross-referent creates
dicta for future manipulation by judges and litigants. When the
unanimous Court in Bennett construed citizen suit provisions in the
Clean Water Act ("CWA") and several other statutes as distinguishable
from, and narrower than, the Endangered Species Act's provision,
that interpretation modified the likely future reach of the CWA. Fur-
thermore, due to the Court's failure even to look at its own past inter-
pretations of the CWA, the Court neglected to grapple with its own
242 See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 611-12 n.4 (1991)
(demonstrating the majority's explicit rejection of the view that legislative history is
irrelevant to statutory interpretation), discussed in ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 9, at
624-25. In Brown & Williamson, the justices do not explicitly explain why they viewed
the case as appropriate for reference to such a wide range of legislative authorities, but
all members of the Court joined opinions that delved deeply into legislative history
and context, not just the primary statute's text. See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing Brown
& I17lliamson).
243 Professor Merrill similarly observes that "[h]aving fewer tools to work with, the
textualist-like the painter working with a small palett[e]-necessarily has to become
more imaginative in resolving questions of statutory interpretation." Thomas W.
Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 373
(1994), quoted in Strauss, supra note 9, at 254.
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previous opinions giving the CWA a broader interpretation.' " Em-
bracing an interpretive technique that unavoidably will create dicta
regarding a statutory provision not even before the court and unlikely
to have received scrutiny from briefing poses a risk of unsettling other
bodies of law and empowering judges to pursue their own policy pref-
erences.
3. Textualist Rejection of the Sounds of Legislative Silence
Textualists typically refuse to draw inferences from legislative fail-
ures to overrule case law or agency interpretations of statutes and
similarly question re-enactment of laws as revealing ratification of pre-
vious interpretations, unless actual evidence of such intent exists.24
This approach, too, is in tension with the one-Congress fiction inter-
pretive technique. Justice Scalia has explicitly argued against the
246
drawing of inferences from legislative inaction. Inaction could sig-
nify congressional approval of the status quo, but it might also simply
reflect indifference or unawareness of the status quo or, perhaps, a di-
247vided view of the status quo. Similarly, in the context of the one-
Congress fiction, courts are drawing inferences from congressional
244 See supra notes 33-48, 144-47 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court's construction of provisions in environmental laws regarding citizen litigation).
245 For a decision in whichJustice Scalia declined to apply the "re-enactment rule"
due to the absence of a uniform preceding interpretation of the disputed language,
see Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566-68 (1988). Justice Scalia stated, however, that
where there has been consistent prior interpretation of particular language by the ju-
diciary, then re-enactment of the same language "generally includes the settledjudicial
interpretation." Id. at 567.
See, e.g.,Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671 (1987) (Scalia,J., dissent-
ing) ("[We should admit that vindication by congressional inaction is a canard.").
247 See id. ("[I] t [is] impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congres-
sional failure to act represents (1) approval of the status quo, as opposed to (2) inabil-
ity to agree upon how to alter the status quo, (3) unawareness of the status quo, (4)
indifference to the status quo, or even (5) political cowardice."). The majority subse-
quently embraced this argument, refusing to draw significance from legislative inac-
tion in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union. 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1 (1989) ("It is 'impossible
to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents' af-
firmative congressional approval of the Court's statutory interpretation." (quoting Jus-
tice Scalia's Johnson dissent)); see also United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 703
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing again the drawing of inferences from legisla-
tive inaction as "an uncertain enterprise which takes as its starting point disregard of
the checks and balances in the constitutional scheme of legislation designed to assure
that not all desires of a majority of the Legislature find their way into law"). For more
detailed arguments on this issue, see generally Eskridge, supra note 130. In Brown &
Williamson, however, the Court's textualists did not dissent or state disapproval of the
Court's substantial reliance on legislative actors' views that never found their way into
new statutes. See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing Brown & Williamson).
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adoption of particular language that could be embraced for a wide
range of reasons. As discussed above, where the Court seeks to make
its own interpretations of similar language consistent but also looks
for indications of links between two cross-referenced provisions, the
effort to maintain judicial consistency has a precedent in the in pai
matefia doctrine. For the same reasons that Justice Scalia has vocifer-
ously criticized drawing inferences from legislative silence, the one-
Congress fiction should be shunned or, at least, warily applied.
4. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation and
the One-Congress Fiction
Textualists contrast their mode of interpretation not only with
that of judges willing to examine legislative history but also with that
of advocates of "dynamic" modes of interpretation. 8 The most
prominent advocate of the latter methods is Professor Eskridge, but
Professor Aleinikoff and former Yale Law School dean and current
Judge Calabresi have also suggested, albeit in different formulations
and with different rationales, that courts should, in essence, update
laws by means of judicial interpretations.2 ' This is called "dynamic"
interpretation in the sense that an unchanged text can be interpreted
in a changed manner depending on "what it ought to mean in terms
of the needs and goals of our present day society."2 51 Justice Scalia's
response to this suggested methodology is, first, to concede that it de-
scribes actual results in some cases.2 He then dismisses this ap-
proach, stating that "[i]t is simply not compatible with democratic
theory that laws mean whatever they ought to mean, and that
unelectedjudges decide what that is."
2
5
2
As shown above, however, use of the one-Congress fiction allows a
similarly liberating mode of interpretation. If courts can engage in
interstatutory comparisons and draw inferences from textual compari-
sons alone without reference to historical context, even when the
statutory referent post-dates the primary text at issue, courts can en-
i Justice Scalia explicitly rejects what he characterizes as Professor Eskridge's em-
brace of dynamic statutory interpretation. SCALIA, supra note 4, at 22.
13 For their respective arguments, see generally CALABRESI, supra note 12;
Aleinikoff, supra note 129.
2 SCALJA, supra note 4, at 22 (quotingESKRIDGE, supra note 12, at 50 (quoting Ar-
thur W. Phelps, Factors InfluencingJudges in Interpreting Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REV. 456,469
(1950))).
Ad SeeSCALIA, supra note 4, at 22.
"52 Id.
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gage in just the same sort of ends-oriented interpretation that ignores
evidence of intended meaning or some shared set of interpretive as-
sumptions. Dynamic modes of interpretation in some vague sense at
least call for fealty to a principal which appears, in various places, ei-
ther to be the current Congress, prevailing societal views, or perhaps a
judge's conception of current societal needs. The one-Congress fic-
tion, in contrast, disregards loyalty to anything but the United States
Code or ajudge's own policy preferences, to the frequent exclusion of
other legal authority such as regulations or case law.23 This point is
not a justification for dynamic modes of interpretation, which I, for
many of the reasons articulated by Professor Nagle, find troubling.2
Professor Eskridge asserts thatJusice Scalia's "holistic textual analysis
is no more determinate, objective, or constraining than other ar-
chaeological approaches to statutory interpretation. " 25 Whether he
can convincingly make this point about all aspects of "holistic textual
analysis" is debatable, but Eskridge is undoubtedly correct that the
one-Congress fiction shares similar 'judge-liberating" elements. This
Article, however, does not conclude that both are therefore appropri-
ate. Instead, this Article suggests that while interstatutory cross-
referencing is appropriate in limited contexts, courts should generally
abandon the one-Congress fiction.
C. Textualism Revisited in Light of the One-Congress Fiction
The one-Congress fiction's questionable logic illuminates the
weak normative and empirical underpinnings of some broader claims
about textualist modes of interpretation. The question remains, how-
ever, whether this critique merely reveals this interpretive move as a
shoddy form of textualism or instead reveals pervasive problems with
textualism. Much as this Article has suggested that examination of
historical context and materials can enlighten without rewarding self-
referential manipulations of history, might the one-Congress fiction
be textualism's analog to excessive reliance on legislator statements in
legislative history? In other words, could one logically embrace many
of textualism's claims and benefits and still reject this particular prac-
tice? This section briefly shows how at least a few of the one-Congress
253 See Funk, supra note 9, at 846-47 (arguing that in the face of genuine statutory
ambiguity, judges barred from examining legislative history who wish to act in good
faith "must necessarily impose their view of the law on the law").
SeeJohn Copeland Nagle, Newt Gingrich, Dynamic Statutory Interpreter, 143 U. PA.
L. REV. 2209 (1995) (critiquing ESKRIGE, supra note 12).
25 EsKamDGE, supra note 12, at 44.
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fiction's weaknesses are reflective of inherent flaws in several of textu-
alism's basic tenets.
First and foremost, the inability to reason across statutory texts to
reach interpretive inferences largely also holds true with text-only in-
terpretations of a single statute. Any purported embrace of a statute's
"plain meaning" in light of the text's ordinary meaning necessarily
empowers a judge to utilize implicit interpretive assumptions, select
among statutory canons, and even select among dictionary defini-
tions.' 5 Judges' preferences for specificity under textualist interpre-
tive modes, for example, may trump legislative drafters' possible pref-
erence for a more open-textured delegation of agency power and
257
hence frustrate legislative supremacy goals. Judicial consideration
of context can constrain, rather than empower, judges in construing
one statute or engaging in interstatutory cross-referencing. The
common textualist fear that any consideration of historical or statu-
tory context will unduly free judges to pursue their policy preferences
is an overly broad assumption. Judges faced with tough interpretive
tasks will need to look somewhere for guidance. Judges who look at
the whole United States Code for interpretive inferences under the
one-Congress fiction, or a wall of dictionaries and available definitions
in interpreting a single statute, are freed to engage in creative reason-
ing from these largely indeterminate sources.28 It is far from obvious
that sensitivity to context is more prone to abuse than is attention to
text alone.29 The question is: What interpretive approaches are most
2% See Farber, supra note 193, at 552 ("Notably, from the drafter's perspective, the
formalist approach suffers from defects like those of the most extreme anti-formalist
approach, in which the primary factor in interpretation is the judge's view of public
policy, with statutory language and legislative purpose receiving only subsidiary atten-
tion.").
25 See id. at 551 (describing how such judicial preferences constrain the set of
drafting options otherwise available to a legislative drafter). For example, Justice
Breyer in his Brown & Williamson dissent suggests that the FDA's authority under the
1938 FDCA should have been construed in light of the enacting period's broad delega-
tions of authority to agencies. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct.
1291, 1318 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). The majority, however, looks for language
specifically empowering the FDA to regulate tobacco. Id. at 1300-01. For further dis-
cussion of Brown & Williamson, see supra Part I.B.3.
2 See Funk, supra note 9, at 846-47 ("[W]e must ask the judge to read the statute
like an ordinary person, albeit a learned and informed ordinary person."); Strauss, su-
pra note 9, at 253 ("Knowledge of the political history of legislation and a disposition
to be informed by it (in what are unmistakably thejudiciary's ownjudgments) makes of
thejudiciary. . . a more readily trusted agent.").n, Professor Farber convincingly suggests that judges and other law interpreters
will, over time, build up sensitivity to context and become expert in discerning statu-
tory patterns and associated policy implications. He therefore suggests that judicial
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likely to produce principled reasoning, constructive conversation
among Congress, agencies, and courts, and sound results, rather than
ends-oriented manipulation of interpretive methods and statutory ma-
terials? The one-Congress fiction is vulnerable to such manipulation,
as are most text-only interpretive approaches.
The larger problem with textualism highlighted throughout this
critique of the one-Congress fiction is neglect of the implications of
the "legislative chaos" that produces legislation."O Because Congress is
a "they," not an "it," as argued by Judge Easterbrook and Professor
Shepsle, and because this collective entity is invariably influenced by
interest group pressures and complicated procedural and institutional
hurdles, comprehensive rationality cannot be expected. For textual-
ists like Judge Easterbrook, text must reign supreme because "intent"
201cannot be found and only the text is enacted into law. Such a view
of Congress and legislation does not focus on wishful thinking that a
211tough-minded Court will discipline the unruly legislature. Under
theories of politics rooted in the legislature's complex and collective
identity, intent will not be found. Such views of the legislature do not
rule out the possibility that tough interpretive questions might benefit
from examination of historical context or a statute's objectively ascer-
tainable purposes.2" For the same reasons that Congress's collective
nature does not allow one to draw inferences from the one-Congress
fiction about what Congress "knows how to do," rigorous judicial re-
view is unlikely to lead to legislative excellence. The schools of textu-
alism rooted in "demand side reductionism" err in failing to examine
the implications of the complexities of the legislative process and of
264
Congress's collective nature.
attention to context will render choices made more predictable as interpreters develop
what Karl Llewellyn called "'situation sense.'" See Farber, supra note 193, at 556-58
(discussing the enigmatic question of how expertise develops). In contrast, Farber
questions the wisdom of the "willful[] ignoran[ce]" called for by plain-meaning inter-
pretive methods. Id. at 553.
260 See generally Vincent Di Lorenzo, Legislative Chaos: An Exploratory Study, 12 YALE
L. & POLY REv. 425 (1994) (providing an overview of "chaos theory" as it applies to
legislative activity).
261 See Easterbrook, supra note 72, at 547 (concluding that any search for intent is
indeterminate).
262 See Schacter, supra note 35 (exploring how various "metademocratic" concep-
tions drive schools of statutory interpretation).
263 See Shepsle, supra note 62, at 250-54 & n.27 (arguing that legislative intent does
not exist but also suggesting that scrutiny of a statute's procedural history could assist
judges in resolving tough interpretive questions).
6 Id. at 240-41 (describing Chicago-school public choice theory as asymmetric
demand-side reductionism that focuses inordinately on interest group demands rather
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Finally, many statutory interpretation scholars emphasize the im-
portance of predictable "interpretive conventions" against which the
legislature can work.2"5 As shown above, however, courts' statutory in-
terpretations reached by means of the one-Congress fiction cannot be
predicted by even an omniscient drafter. Due to the complexities of
the legislative process and Congress's collective nature as noted by
public choice scholars, even a single statute is unlikely to be drafted
with such interpretive conventions in mind. For textualists to deni-
grate the concept of "legislative intent," yet draw inferences based on
comparisons of two statutes' provisions, is to disregard the very public
choice skepticism motivating textualism's most basic tenets. This
author believes that the goal of consistent and principled interpretive
conventions is nevertheless appropriate, but I reach this conclusion
only by taking into account other realities of legislation such as the
role of professional staff and counsel, numerous checks on legislative
history and judicial abuse, and politicians' desire to achieve political
goals despite the many hurdles to political success. These additional
factors influencing the process of drafting legislation may be viewed as
inappropriate for consideration in the interpretive process by textual-
ists, but it is difficult to expect even a modicum of rationality in legis-
lation-let alone even occasional linguistic consistency in two or more
laws-without taking these factors into account.
IV. MODIFY OR DISCARD THE ONE-CONGRESS FICTION?
The one-Congress fiction is a text-based interpretive move, yet it
undercuts textualism's strongest goals. When utilized only in text-to-
text comparisons, this interpretive move is highly manipulable and
vulnerable to error. Both in theory and in practice, it has been used
in ways that unnecessarily unsettle referent law. It also constitutes an
odd or paradoxical anthropomorphizing of the legislature by justices
who generally shun any references to legislative intent, decline to
draw inferences from legislative silence, and criticize dynamic modes
of interpretation. This interpretive move is particularly troublesome
than the "supply" side of politicians' incentives and the structures of political institu-
tions).
See SCALIA, supra note 4, at 14-15; Farber, supra note 193, at 549 (stating that a
primary goal of an interpretive method is to "give Congress a sure means by which it
may work the people's will" (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 417 (1991)
(Scalia, J., dissenting))); Manning, supra note 171, at 690 ("[P]ositivist theories of in-
terpretation suggest that 'legislative intent' has little to do with the genuine intentions
of legislators, and much to do with legislators' intentions to enact statutes that will be
interpreted according to accepted interpretive conventions.").
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when applied in a manner that no legislator could ever predict. To
the extent the one-Congress fiction cases analyzed here reflect what
Professors Popkin and Zeppos and Judge Posner refer to as an as-
sumption of an omniscient and ideal legislative drafter, this interpre-
tive move should be discarded. Nevertheless, this Article concludes
that a far more limited and rigorous version of interstatutory cross-
referencing is both inevitable and could be applied in a more neutral
and defensible manner.
What would this more limited type of interstatutory cross-
referencing look like? It would look much like the usual application
of the in pari materia doctrine, with courts only making interstatutory
comparisons where there was actual indication of a legislative expecta-
tion of such cross-references and with courts paying far more atten-
tion to their own previous interpretations of primary and referent
provisions. In addition, courts would also need to look at other as-
pects of historical context of both the primary and referent provisions,
particularly agency interpretations appearing to influence language
choices. These limitations mean that the kind of random language-
only cross-references appearing in Bennett and Casey should be dis-
carded. Promoting legislative excellence is a legitimate goal, but the
cases examined in Part I reveal a mode of interpretation that could
not be anticipated by legislators and that amounts to a highly manipu-
lable interpretive move that, in reality, is not much of an interpretive
convention at all. Analysis of actual historical context and the primary
and referent statutes' separate "vertical" histories is needed to make
this practice more predictable and grounded in reality.
Limited interstatutory references are unavoidable due to courts',
particularly the Supreme Court's, necessary role in resolving disputes
over statutory meaning. The Brown & Williamson Court, for example,
could not avoid analysis of post-1938 laws regulating tobacco.' 6 Judi-
cial reinvention of the interpretive task in every case, even with respect
to language shared in many statutes, would result in a garbled line of
case precedents that would make legislating, regulating, and even liti-
gating difficult. Judicial attention to the court's own handiwork re-
mains an important goal, as it has always been under the in pari mate-
ia doctrine. Courts should still, however, only make judicial
consistency a secondary goal to carrying out legislative intent as dis-
cerned from the reasonable objective meaning of statutory language,
construed in light of that particular statute's history and context.
266 For more detailed discussion of Brown & Wlliamson, see supra Part I.B.3.
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Even without resorting to self-referential legislative history, courts can
and should look at a statute's historical context. 67 In an interesting
quirk ofjudicial history, or perhaps reflecting the evolution of Justice
Scalia's jurisprudence, a few ofJustice Scalia's interstatutory reference
opinions from the late 1980s reflect a much more sensitive analysis of
the historical context of both the primary and referent statutes.s Jus-
tice Kennedy's opinion in Bragdon v. Abbott similarly provides an ex-
ample of interstatutory cross-referencing that involves a much more
complete examination of historical context.269 He looks across to
other bodies of law but searches for indications that such comparisons
were before the legislature as well.
This limited embrace of interstatutory cross-references and the re-
jection of the one-Congress fiction reflect this author's wariness about
any judicial approach to disputes over particular statutory provisions
that seeks to make sense of the law as a whole. In this goal, Justice
Scalia shares an aspiration with Professors Eskridge, Aleinikoff, and
Dworkin. What each of these scholars would do with this authority
differs, but all appear comfortable with the task. Justice Scalia calls for
the judge to seize each interpretive opportunity and constrain not
! See Farber, supra note 193, at 554-59 (defending practical reasoning and, with
analogies to chess and other disciplines where expertise matters, suggesting that atten-
tion to the larger context leads to sounder results).
2M See, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 56368 (1988) (considering various
contextual arguments in its interpretation of the phrase "substantiallyjustified"); Kun-
gys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 769-72 (1988) (engaging in a historical analysis of
the concept of materiality). Justice Scalia also engaged in a more history-rooted analy-
sis in a recent concurrence in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340
(1998). He concurred in the majority's judgment regarding the right to a jury trial
under the Seventh Amendment in the context of a Copyright Act damages claim, but
reached his conclusion with a concise but thorough examination of the vertical history
of the Copyright Act and with reference to parallel provisions of a few preceding laws
and judicial constructions of those laws. Id. at 355-59.
The Court had to construe the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") to de-
termine if it was applicable to an HIV-infected patient's claim against a dentist for fail-
ure to treat her in Bragdon v. Abbot4 524 U.S. 624 (1998). The Court delved into paral-
lel provisions in previous statutes and "the views of various administrative agencies
which have faced this interpretive question." Id. at 631. This cross-statutory reference
and examination of previous administrative interpretations was arguably required by
the ADA's direction that "nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser
standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 ... or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such a title."
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (1994) (citation omitted).
The Court went even further, however, by looking at the details of agency examina-
tions of HV and disability issues, legislative history indicating Congress's awareness of
agency interpretations of earlier related laws, as well asjudicial precedents concerning
parallel definitions. 524 U.S. at 637-47.
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only wayward and possibly sloppy legislators but also ideologically mo-
tivated and untrustworthy judges. He then, in a display of cognitive
dissonance, calls on these same judges to use each interpretive oppor-
tunity to create a sensible corpus juris unless the primary statute pre-
cludes such an effort.
The track record of recent one-Congress fiction cases should give
all pause. Text-to-text comparisons have led the Court to disregard
actually articulated intent, historical context, and the Court's own
contradictory precedents. Courts should pay attention to their own
precedents, but can any judge or body of judges know what line of
statutory, regulatory, or case law might be unsettled by a text-to-text
comparison that ignores the historical context of the referent? Fur-
thermore, for reasons discussed above in Part I, any attempt to make
interstatutory references and impose judicial order on different fields
of regulation implemented by different agencies and enacted through
different committees is particularly vulnerable to judicial error. In-
deed, the embrace of mere text-to-text comparisons as an approach to
determine statutory meaning and make sense of the law as a whole re-
flects an unsound overestimation of any judge's ability, regardless of
that judge's considerable legal acumen and wisdom. Statutory law is
not a closed system but an evolving process that necessarily involves
different legislators, agency officials, presidents, courts, and social
contexts. The United States Code is not the only source of law. In-
stead, legal partisans invariably will participate in the legislative proc-
ess based on assessment of existing statutes, regulations, judicial opin-
ions, and even the current and anticipated political climate. In such a
multistage, complex game that is akin to an evolving conversation,
participants in the process are likely to react to many more variables
than mere linguistic choices in another statute. The assumption of
such legislative attention to linguistic choices across bodies of law con-
stitutes an unsound interpretive convention that cannot be antici-
pated by participants in the legislative process.
CONCLUSION
The one-Congress fiction interpretive technique should be aban-
doned and replaced with, at most, a more limited and historically rig-
orous version of interstatutory cross-referencing. The one-Congress
fiction is a prevalent textual mode of interpretation in numerous Su-
preme Court cases, but this particular technique is vulnerable to mis-
use. It has led to interpretive leaps that disregard reasonably dis-
cernible legislative goals and misconstrue the import of referent laws'
THE ONE-CONGRESS FICTION
provisions. Paradoxically, one of the best arguments for judicial mod-
esty and abandonment of such a desire to improve the law in each
case comes from Justice Scalia himself. He states that it is inappropri-
ate in a statutory age for judges to ask, "[w]hat is the most desirable
resolution of this case, and how can any impediments to the achieve-
ment of that result be evaded?" 7 ° The Court's use of the one-
Congress fiction necessarily calls for just such an inappropriately ex-
panded judicial role. A more modest judicial method that only warily
makes interstatutory references, and only then with attention to the
primary and referent provisions' historical context and implementa-
tion history, would be far more consonant with this limited and realis-
tic view of the abilities ofjudges and the legislature.
z&,, SCM-A, supra note 4, at 13.
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